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INTRODUCTION
Technological progress is generally cumulative. Most often, inventors rely
on the discoveries of others to make a new discovery, and so the new discovery
is really a combination of the old with the new. When this occurs, the issue of
how to allocate intellectual property rights between the former and later
inventors may arise. Obviously, there are tradeoffs.1 Granting all the
intellectual property rights to the first inventor (or inventors, if the later
inventor relies on multiple prior inventors) removes the incentive for the later
inventor to make the new discovery because the first inventor would reap all
the rewards from both the initial and new discoveries. If the first inventor
lacks either the expertise or sufficient incentive to make the new discovery,
there may be no technological progress.
On the other hand, granting all the intellectual property rights to the later
inventor may remove at least some of the incentive for the first inventor to
make the original discovery. While the first inventor still would have the
benefit of intellectual property rights from the original discovery, these may
not be very valuable if the new discovery competes with the original discovery
or renders it obsolete. Denying the first inventor intellectual property rights in
the new discovery could make enough of a difference that the first inventor
would not have sufficient incentive to make the original discovery in the first
place.2 Again, there may be no technological progress, especially if the new
discovery would not have been possible without the original discovery.
It would appear that allocation of intellectual property rights requires
consideration of a variety of factors. One of these might be the relative
significance of the contributions of the first and second inventors. Surely, the
inventor that makes the greater contribution ought to receive the larger share of
the rewards from cumulative inventions. An original invention may facilitate a
later invention in at least three ways.3 In some cases, the later invention might
not be possible without the first.4 In other cases, the original invention might
reduce the cost of development of the later invention, or accelerate the later
invention’s development.5 To the extent that an original invention makes the
1. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) (“The challenge is to reward early
innovators fully for the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward
later innovators adequately for their improvements and new products as well.”).
2. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 20 (1995) (“[T]he social value of an early innovation includes
the net social value of the applications it facilitates. If the first innovator does not collect that
value as profit, he might not invest even if the combined profit of the innovations exceeds the
combined costs.”).
3. See Scotchmer, supra note 1, at 31.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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development of a later invention possible, cheaper, or faster, the social value of
the original invention would include a portion of the later invention’s value,
and the intellectual property rights to the second invention should be allocated
to the original inventor accordingly.6 Another factor might be the payoffs the
first and second inventors need to recover their costs of making their respective
discoveries.7 Depending on the specific circumstances, these factors may be
more or less difficult to ascertain.
Copyright law awards all the intellectual property rights to the first creator
of an original work of authorship and no copyright to a creator of a derivative
work made without the permission of the first creator.8 In contrast, patent law
authorizes an inventor of an improvement to an original invention to obtain a
patent on the improvement, provided that the improvement satisfies the
standards for patentability.9 A possible reason for this difference is that the
range of potential works of authorship is greater than the range of
improvements for inventions. The range of potential works of authorship is
limited only by the imagination of the author. The author of a screenplay
about a sports figure does not have to use the character of Rocky Balboa, for
example, but is free to make up an original character, while Sylvester Stallone
retains all the rights to develop derivative works based on the Rocky
character.10 Thus, the ability of later authors to obtain intellectual property
rights for their new works of authorship is not irretrievably constrained by
awarding all the intellectual property rights to the first creator of an original
work of authorship. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, are constrained

6. Id.
7. See Green & Scotchmer, supra note 2, at 21.
8. See, e.g. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 522 (7th Cir. 2009) (“To
be copyrightable, a derivative work must not be infringing.”); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning
L.L.C., 386 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the owner of the original copyright has the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works, the creator of an original derivative work is only
entitled to a copyright if she had permission to use the copyrighted work.”). Damages for
copyright infringement, however, are limited to the amount of the infringer’s profits attributable
to the original work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover .
. . any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement . . . .”); Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 396 (1940) (“[I]n computing an award of profits against
an infringer of a copyright, there may be an apportionment so as to give to the owner of the
copyright only that part of the profits found to be attributable to the use of the copyrighted
material as distinguished from what the infringer himself has supplied.”).
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (authorizing inventor of “any new and useful improvement”
of an invention to obtain a patent for the improvement).
10. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989).
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by the laws of nature, because they must actually work to be patentable.11 An
inventor is not as free to make up an improvement that does not rely on an
original invention as a later author is to create a work of authorship that does
not rely on an original work of authorship. Accordingly, there may be greater
justification for awarding intellectual property rights to the inventor of an
improvement than there is for awarding them to the author of a derivative
work.12
While an inventor of an improvement to an original invention may receive
a patent, the patent on the improvement could potentially be subject to a patent
on the original invention. In these circumstances, neither the inventor of the
improvement nor the inventor of the original invention would be allowed to
make, use, offer to sell, or sell the improvement without the consent of the
other.13 The patent on the improvement would block the inventor of the
original invention from practicing the improvement without permission of the
improvement’s inventor, and if the improvement is within the scope of the
patent on the original invention, the patent on the original invention would
block the improvement’s inventor from practicing the improvement without
permission of the inventor.14 Third parties who wish to practice the invention
on the improvement would have to get permission from both inventors.
Consequently, the first and second inventors would share the intellectual
property rights in the patent on the improvement with the allocation of the
licensing revenue left to negotiation between them.15

11. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring inventions to be useful); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)
(requiring patent applications to contain a written description of the invention that enables a
person of ordinary skill in the area to make and use the invention).
12. For a more thorough analysis of the different treatments of improvements to inventions
in patent law and derivative works in copyright law, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997). Professor Lemley calls
the reason presented in the text for the differing treatment of improvements under patent and
copyright law the “different works” argument. Id. at 1034–38. He also considers three additional
justifications for the differing treatment that he calls the moral rights, balance of power, and
market power arguments. Id. at 1031–34, 1038–42. He ultimately rejects all these arguments and
concludes that copyright law should be modified to conform more closely to the patent law
approach for allocating intellectual property rights in improvements. Id. at 1044, 1069, 1084.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
14. Lemley, supra note 12, at 1000–01.
15. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81 (1994) (“An independent patent on an improvement
. . . facilitates improver-pioneer bargaining.”). In the context of injunctive relief in litigation, the
allocation of profits between first and second inventors might be accomplished through
conditioning the issuance of injunctive relief on the payments between the inventors. See 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (authorizing a federal court to grant injunctive relief for patent infringement
“on such terms as the court deems reasonable”).
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The situation is an example of a bilateral monopoly in which two parties
have to bargain with each other over something of value.16 In the absence of a
market to determine a price within the bargaining range, the parties to a
bilateral monopoly may incur substantial costs to arrive at a settlement point,
or they could be unable to settle with each other at all.17 Similarly, two
inventors with blocking patents may be unable to agree on the allocation of
their intellectual property rights in the improvement with the result that neither
they nor any third parties would be able to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the
improvement. Blocking patents could therefore interfere with technological
progress.18
Whether a patent on an original invention blocks a patent on a later
invention depends on the scope of the patent on the original invention and
whether the later invention comes within the scope of the patent on the original
invention. The scope of a patent generally depends on its claims, which are
found at the end of the specification in the patent application and the issued
patent.19 Usually a patent attorney will draft patent claims as broadly as
possible in order to maximize the coverage. There are a number of constraints,
however, on the scope of claims available to a patent drafter.
On the one hand, the scope is constrained by the prior art in the field. The
requirement of “novelty,” for example, bars claims from encroaching on
inventions that were known or used by others in the United States, or that were
described in a printed publication anywhere in the world before the patent
applicant’s own invention.20 In addition, the requirement of “nonobviousness”
bars claims for an invention whose differences from the prior art are such that
the new invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art at the time the patent applicant first made the invention.21

16. For discussions of bilateral monopoly, see In re Hopkins, 102 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.
1996) (Posner, J.), abrogated on other grounds by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953 (1997); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62, 597–98 (7th ed. 2007).
17. Walgreen, 966 F.2d at 276.
18. For examples of blocking patents interfering with progress in the early electrical lighting
industry and the development of automobile, aircraft, and radio technology, see Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885–
93 (1990).
19. The patent case law has also developed a doctrine of equivalents, which in some cases
may extend the range of a patent beyond the literal scope of the claims. The additional range
from the doctrine of equivalents is limited to insubstantial variations that perform the same
function in substantially the same way to produce the same result as the original invention, and it
is therefore dependent on the literal scope of the claims. For additional discussion of the doctrine
of equivalents, see infra text accompanying notes 163–83.
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
21. See id. § 103(a).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

60

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:55

On the other hand, the scope of claims is constrained by the disclosures
that the patent applicant makes in the specification in the patent application.
The specification is required to provide a written description of the invention,
as well as the process for making and using it, that is sufficient to enable any
person who is skilled in the art to make and use the invention.22 In addition,
the specification must elaborate the best mode for carrying out the invention
that the inventor contemplated.23
It would seem that combining the enablement requirement for an original
patent with the nonobviousness requirement for a later patent would preclude
the possibility that the original patent could block the later patent.24 If the first
inventor failed to provide a written description that enabled any person skilled
in the art to make and use the later invention, then the enablement requirement
would bar the first inventor from including the later invention in the claims in
the original patent. The original patent consequently would not block the later
patent because the later patent would be outside the original patent’s scope.
On the other hand, if the first inventor did provide a written description that
enabled a person skilled in the art to make and use the later invention without
undue experimentation, then the original patent would have been part of the
prior art with respect to the later invention. So the second patent would be
invalid on account of the nonobviousness requirement.
Despite this syllogism, the existence of blocking patents has long been
recognized by the courts as well as by academic commentators.25 One
common circumstance where blocking patents may occur is where the
improvement to a prior invention consists of the combination of a component
with the prior invention.26 If the prior invention is represented as “A,” then the
improvement may be represented as “A + B.”27 Even though the combination
may be patentable if it is nonobvious, a patent on the prior invention will block
practice of the combination, because the practice of the combination
22. See id. § 112.
23. Id.
24. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope Into After-Arising
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 511
(2008) (“Whenever there are blocking patents, the literal scope of N’s earlier or ‘dominant’ claim
reaches beyond what N actually invented and encompasses the things produced by N+1’s later or
‘subservient’ invention.”); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations
on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379–80 n.73 (1992) (describing the
possibility that an improvement invention may be both nonobvious and infringing as a
conundrum).
25. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 18, at 861 n.96.
26. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 1009 (“[A]dding to an infringing machine does not relieve
a defendant of liability for an infringement.”). For an example of blocking patents resulting from
the combination of a component with a prior invention, see infra text accompanying notes 81–83.
27. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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necessarily entails infringement of the patent on the prior invention.28 An
example might be the combination of a pencil with an eraser. Assuming that a
patent on the pencil was valid, the combination of the pencil with an eraser
might also satisfy the requirements for patentability, but the combination could
not be made or used without infringing the patent on the pencil.29
Consequently, the patent on the prior invention will dominate a patent on the
combination. Moreover, under the “entire market value rule,” damages for
infringement of a prior invention will not be allocated between the prior
invention and a component, but rather, will be based on the profits from sales
of the combination as long as the combination of the prior invention with the
component constitute a functional unit.30
In most situations, the development of the combination would likely not
have been possible without the prior invention, and, therefore, it is appropriate
for a patent on the prior invention to be allocated substantial intellectual
property rights in the subsequent combination. It is conceivable, however, that
the development of the combination may have occurred independently of the
prior invention.31 If the prior invention did not make the development of the
combination possible, cheaper, or faster, allocating intellectual property rights
in the combination might not be appropriate from an economic standpoint.
Another circumstance where blocking patents may occur is where one
patent is on a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, and another
patent exists for a process to make or use the machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. This possibility for blocking patents arises from the
disjunctive elements for infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): “[W]hoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention . . . during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”32
An inventor of a novel, useful, and nonobvious process for using or making a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter would be entitled to a patent
for the process, even if the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter

28. Id.; Lemley, supra note 12, at 1009 (“Thus, if the improvement consists of additions to
the basic structure claimed in the original patent, that improvement will not avoid infringement
even though it would not have been obvious to the original patentee.”).
29. I am indebted to Mark Lemley for this illustration.
30. Cf. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A
patentee may recover lost profits on unpatented components sold with a patented item, a
convoyed sale, if both the patented and unpatented products ‘together were considered to be
components of a single assembly or parts of a complete machine, or they together constituted a
functional unit.’” (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1995))); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
31. For the example of polypropylene, see infra text accompanying notes 187–229 and 338–
43.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
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was subject to its own patent.33 Nevertheless, the patent on the process could
not be exploited without a license from the patentee of the patent on the
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Under § 271(a), any process
for making or using a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
would infringe the patent on the machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, regardless of whether the process for making or using the patented
invention was itself novel and nonobvious.34
Judge Rader provided the following hypothetical illustrating blocking
patents on a composition for shoe polish and a process for using the
composition to grow hair in Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc.:
Inventor A invents a shoe polish for shining shoes (which, for the sake of
example, is novel, useful, and nonobvious). Inventor A receives a patent
having composition claims for shoe polish. Indeed, the preamble of these
hypothetical claims recites “a composition for polishing shoes.” Clearly,
Inventor B could not later secure a patent with composition claims on the same
composition because it would not be novel. Likewise, Inventor B could not
secure claims on the method of using the composition for shining shoes
because the use is not a “new use” of the composition but, rather, the same use
shining shoes.
Suppose Inventor B discovers that the polish also repels water when
rubbed onto shoes. Inventor B could not likely claim a method of using the
polish to repel water on shoes because repelling water is inherent in the normal
use of the polish to shine shoes. In other words, Inventor B has not invented a
“new” use by rubbing polish on shoes to repel water. Upon discovering,
however, that the polish composition grows hair when rubbed on bare human
skin, Inventor B can likely obtain method claims directed to the new use of the
composition to grow hair. Hence, while Inventor B may obtain a blocking
patent on the use of Inventor A’s composition to grow hair, this method patent
does not bestow on Inventor B any right with respect to the patented

33. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (“The term ‘process’ . . . includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”). Before the adoption of this
provision in 1952, a new use of an old product or composition was held to be not patentable.
Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“It is no new invention to use an old machine for a new
purpose. The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put,
no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”); In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347
(C.C.P.A. 1943) (“[A] patent for a new use for an old substance quite unchanged is not authorized
by the patent laws because such use is not the invention or discovery of ‘any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof’ as
required by Section 4886 of the Revised Statutes, U.S.C. Title 35, Sec. 31, 35 U.S.C.A. § 31.”);
Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 768,
775–80 (1969).
34. Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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composition. Even though Inventor A’s claim recites “a composition for
polishing shoes,” Inventor B cannot invoke this use limitation to limit Inventor
A’s composition claim because that preamble phrase states a use or purpose of
35
the composition and does not impose a limit on Inventor A’s claim.

Thus, a patent for a composition or product will dominate patents for processes
for making or using the composition or product.
As a matter of logic, the existence of a product would be essential to the
development of a process for using the product. Thus, it makes economic
sense to allocate substantial intellectual property rights in the process to the
holder of the patent on the product. It is less clear, however, that the holder of
the patent on the product should be allocated substantial intellectual property
rights in a novel and nonobvious process for making the product. The
enablement requirement for a patent on a product is satisfied if the
specification enables any method of making and using the product.36 In
contrast, the enablement requirement for a patent on a process for making or
using a product would not be satisfied unless the specification enabled the
particular process that was claimed.37 It is certainly possible that one process
for making a product could be developed independently of another process for
making the product. If the first process for making the product did not make
the second process possible, cheaper, or faster in any way, it would probably
not be appropriate from an economic standpoint to allocate substantial
intellectual property rights in the second process to the product’s patent holder.
Nevertheless, § 271(a) makes any subsequently developed process for making
or using a patented product subject to the product’s patent.38
It has been argued that a third circumstance where blocking patents may
occur is when an inventor makes a broad claim to an entire class (or genus) of
products after producing only a single member of the class (or species).
Several commentators have urged that the broad claim to the genus should be
allowed if the species produced by the inventor was the only species in the
genus that was known at the time the inventor filed the patent, and that the

35. Id. at 809–10 (citation omitted).
36. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Lab., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Enablement does not require the inventor to foresee every means of implementing an invention
at pains of losing his patent franchise.”). See also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
314 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law makes clear that the specification need teach
only one mode of making and using a claimed composition.” (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 160 (D. Mass. 2001)); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528,
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode
of making and using the claimed invention.”).
37. See Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1071.
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (noting that there is no restriction to processes known or
claimed).
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patent should then dominate subsequent nonobvious inventions of other
species within the claimed genus.39 The scope of the claim to the genus would
grow over time as new species were invented to populate the genus.
This third circumstance appears to conflict with the reward theory for
patent protection. Under the traditional view, the patent system operates under
a reward theory in which an inventor is given an exclusive right to practice an
invention in order to capture returns from the investment in research and
development in exchange for full disclosure of the invention so that the public
may use the invention after expiration of the patent’s term.40
Edmund Kitch has challenged this traditional view with an alternative
theory that he named the “prospect theory.”41 Under the prospect theory, the
scope of a patent should extend beyond what the inventor accomplished to
cover improvements to the invention that are later developed by others.42
Professor Kitch argued that the prospect theory would enhance public welfare
by allowing unified control over the development of the invention to the
original inventor, thereby providing the original inventor with greater
incentives to make investments without fear that the fruits of the invention will
be appropriated by competitors.43 Thus, this prospect theory offers a rationale
for extending the scope of a patent beyond the inventor’s disclosure in the
patent application.
In a recent line of decisions, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit appears to have significantly narrowed the permissible scope of patents
to their disclosures.44 It would seem a likely consequence of the Federal
39. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 295–97 (4th ed. 2007); Collins, supra note 24, at 532; Lemley,
supra note 12, at 1009; Merges, supra note 24.
40. The Supreme Court provided the following synopsis of the reward theory in Universal
Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co.:
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade
secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry
concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.
322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
41. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977).
42. Id. at 275–76.
43. Id.
44. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc.
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Plant Genetic Sys.
N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Wyeth v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1:07CV91, 2009 WL 3335062, at *9 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 14, 2009)
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Circuit’s restriction of the patents’ scopes to their disclosures would be to
narrow the possibilities for blocking patents for improvements to the first and
second circumstances described above and to eliminate the third circumstance
where an inventor could make a valid claim to a genus containing species that
the inventor did not invent.
This Article begins in Part I by tracing the historical background of
blocking patents. Part II sets out the enablement, written description, and
nonobviousness requirements for patentability. Part III analyzes the most
recent example of a blocking patent that has been upheld by the Federal
Circuit—the epic polypropylene case that was litigated over three decades.
Part IV discusses the recent line of decisions from the Federal Circuit. This is
followed by a brief conclusion.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BLOCKING PATENTS
The history of blocking patents in the United States appropriately begins
with the following provision from the Patent Act of 1793:
[A]ny person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of
any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have
been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first
45
inventor be at liberty to use the improvement . . . .

The Supreme Court examined this provision in Evans v. Eaton,46 a case
involving a patent on an improved version of a machine used for
manufacturing flour called a Hopperboy. The plaintiff contended that the
patent was for the whole of the improved Hopperboy, or alternatively, for only
the improvement in the Hopperboy that the plaintiff developed.47 The Court
first determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent on the whole of
the improved Hopperboy because the plaintiff’s invention consisted of only an
addition to the previous embodiment of the Hopperboy.48 The Court then
decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent on his improvement of the
Hopperboy because he had not specified what his improvement was on the
invention.49 The plaintiff described the whole of the improved Hopperboy, but

(following the line of Federal Circuit decisions); Int’l Automated Sys., Inc. v. Digital Persona,
Inc. 565 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1305 (D. Utah 2008).
45. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836, ch.
357, § 20, 5 Stat. 117, 125.
46. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
47. Id. at 357.
48. Id. at 430–31. See also Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)
(No. 17, 971) (noting that unless the patentee invented a whole new machine, the patent should be
confined to the improvement).
49. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 432–35.
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the Court ruled that he must describe his own improvement in order to obtain a
patent on the improvement.50
Congress repealed the explicit provision for blocking patents in 1836,51
and has never reenacted it. Nevertheless, courts continued to recognize the
principle that an original patent could block the practice of a patent on an
improvement to the invention in the original patent.52 The earliest published
decision with such a holding is probably Woodworth v. Rogers.53 Although
Woodworth was decided in 1847, it relied on the Act of 1793, which had been
repealed over a decade before, for the proposition that “no one can make an
improvement on [a patented invention] . . . while the original term, or renewals
of it, exist, without the license of the original patentee.”54 Star Salt Caster Co.
v. Crossman55 followed Woodworth and involved an agreement allocating
royalties between the owner of a patent on an original invention and the owner
of a patent on an improvement to the original invention. In enforcing the
agreement, the court stated:
Two patents of the kind may both be valid where the second is an
improvement upon the first, in which event, if the second includes the first,
neither can lawfully use that of the other without the other’s consent. Plainly
the second patent could not be used without the consent of the owner of the
first, nor could the owner of the first patent use the second without the consent
of the owner, as the patent contains an invention which the owner of the first
56
patent never made.

In Cochrane v. Deemer,57 the Supreme Court held that the defendants
infringed a patent on a process for making flour, even though the defendants
made improvements to the patented process that might themselves have been
patentable.58 The Court concluded that the patented invention was “at the
bottom of” the defendants’ improvements, and the defendants could not
appropriate the patent “even though [the patented invention was] supplemented
by and enveloped in very important and material improvements of their
own.”59

50. Id.
51. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 20, 5 Stat. 117, 125.
52. See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755, 767–68 (1948).
53. 30 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 18,018).
54. Id. at 583.
55. 22 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878) (No. 13,321).
56. Id. at 1135.
57. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
58. Id. at 787.
59. Id.
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The Supreme Court next addressed the relationship between original and
improvement patents in Cantrell v. Wallick.60 The defendants contended that
the patent was invalid because the invention was not entirely novel, but instead
was an improvement on an earlier patented invention.61 Rejecting this
argument, the Court explained:
Two patents may both be valid when the second is an improvement on the
first, in which event, if the second includes the first, neither of the two
patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other without the other’s
consent.
Therefore, letters patent for an improvement on a patented invention
62
cannot be declared void because they include such patented invention.

In Herman v. Youngstown Car Manufacturing Co.,63 the trial court relied
on the fact that the defendant obtained a license for a patent on an
improvement in concluding that the company did not infringe a patent on an
original invention.64 In reversing, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
that the trial court’s reasoning was based on a fundamental error: “A patent is
not the grant of a right to make or use or sell. It does not, directly or indirectly,
imply any such right. It grants only the right to exclude others.”65 The
appellate court continued by noting that many patents are granted in a field that
a prior generic or basic patent covers, and that these patents are tributary to the
prior patent and cannot be practiced without a license from the owner of the
prior patent.66 The court also explained that even though the issuance of an
improvement patent indicates that there is a patentable difference between the
improvement and original invention, the existence of a patentable difference
does not preclude infringement, because the improvement could still be based
on the original invention.67
Besides Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court has dealt with the
subject of blocking patents in only one other case—Temco Electric Motor Co.
v. Apco Manufacturing Co.68 In Temco, the plaintiff was the assignee of a
patent issued to Ralph and William Thompson for shock absorbers on motor
The Thompson patent involved combining relatively high
vehicles.69
frequency coiled springs with the relatively low frequency leaf springs that

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

117 U.S. 689 (1886).
Id. at 694.
Id. (citation omitted).
191 F. 579 (6th Cir. 1911).
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id. at 584–85.
Id. at 585.
275 U.S. 319 (1928).
Id. at 322.
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were originally built into motor vehicles.70 See Figure 1 below.71 Because the
coiled springs and leaf springs oscillated at different frequencies, their
oscillations interfered with each other, and together the two springs quickly
absorbed vibrations from the road.72

Figure 1. The Thompson Patent73
Initially, the Thompson shock absorbers experienced success, but after
several years, it became clear that the coiled springs wore out due to friction
between the springs and the casings in which they moved when an uneven load
tilted the vehicle body.74 To solve this problem, Thompson added a pivot so
that the leaf springs and vehicle body could tilt without affecting the vertical
orientation of the coiled springs.75 See Figure 2 below.76 The Thompsons
applied for a patent for this improvement to their shock absorbers, but the
Patent Office determined in an interference proceeding that William Storrie
had priority on account of a patent application filed five years and five months
after the issuance of the original Thompson patent.77 The Patent Office
therefore issued the patent for the improvement to Storrie.78 Storrie licensed

70. Id.; U.S. Patent No. 1,072,791 (filed Oct. 10, 1912), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/
netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter “1,072,791” in search prompt and then follow “Images”
hyperlink).
71. ‘791 Patent.
72. Temco, 275 U.S. at 322–23.
73. ‘791 Patent.
74. Temco, 275 U.S. at 324–25.
75. Id. at 324; U.S. Patent No. 1,279,035 (filed March 18, 1918), available at http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter “1,279,035” in search prompt and then follow
“Images” hyperlink).
76. ‘035 Patent.
77. Temco, 275 U.S. at 321–22, 325.
78. Id. at 325.
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his patent to the defendant, and the defendant raised the license from Storrie as
a defense in the plaintiff’s action for infringement of the Thompson patent.79
Citing Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court rejected this defense: “It is
well established that an improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of
another, and that the improver without a license is an infringer, and may be
sued as such.”80

Figure 2. The Storrie Patent81
A comparison of the Thompson patent in Figure 1 with the Storrie patent
in Figure 2 shows that they fit within the category of blocking patents where
the improvement is a combination of a component with the earlier invention.
In this case, Storrie combined the pivot on the rod inside the coiled springs to
the shock absorbers in the Thompson patent. Furthermore, having the
Thompson patent dominate the Storrie patent seems appropriate from an
economic standpoint because the Thompsons’ contribution to automotive
technology was surely more significant than Storrie’s contribution. Of course,
before the addition of the pivot, the Thompson shock absorbers wore out after
several years, but the Thompsons made the fundamental advance, while
Storrie’s improvement was less significant.82 It is less clear what payoffs the
Thompsons and Storrie would have needed in order to recover the costs they
incurred in making their respective discoveries, but since the Thompsons also
applied for a patent on the Storrie improvement, it appears that the Thompsons
incurred the improvement costs as well.83 Accordingly, it seems appropriate
that the Thompsons should have been allocated the greater share of the profits
from the invention of the shock absorbers.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 325, 328.
Id. at 328.
‘035 Patent.
Temco, 275 U.S. at 324–25.
Id.
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After Temco, federal courts followed the principle that a patent on an
original patent could block the practice of a patent on an improvement. For
example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the possibility of
blocking patents in New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster:84 “The prior patentee
cannot use the improvement without the consent of the improver, and the latter
cannot use the original invention without the consent of the former.”85 In Wine
Railway Appliance Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,86 the Fourth Circuit dealt with
a patent on an improvement consisting of an additional element combined with
a prior patented invention.87 The court ruled that “it is perfectly well settled
that a device which embodies the principles of a basic patent as well as one for
an improvement infringes both.”88 The Fifth Circuit declared in Zachos v.
Sherwin-Williams Co.89 that “an improver must respect the rights of the patent
on which he improves,”90 and affirmed a judgment finding that the owner of a
patent on a modification that may have been a slight improvement over the
original invention infringed the patent on the original invention.91
The Federal Circuit has also recognized the possibility of blocking patents
on improvements.92 In Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc.,93 the court
commented, “We, of course, agree . . . that one may not be able to practice the
invention protected by a patent directed to an improvement of another’s
patented article or method except with a license under the latter.”94 The court
expressed the same principle in mathematical terms in Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.
du Pont De Nemours & Co.,95 stating, “Du Pont concedes that, if Atlas patents
A + B + C and Du Pont then patents the improvement A + B + C + D, Du Pont
is liable to Atlas for any manufacture, use, or sale of A + B + C + D because
the latter directly infringes claims to A + B + C.”96 The court in Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission97 similarly
remarked, “Devices that have been modified to such an extent that the

84. 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1934).
85. Id. at 279.
86. 78 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1935).
87. Id. at 313–14.
88. Id. at 315–16.
89. 164 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1947).
90. Id. at 235.
91. Id. at 234–35.
92. See, e.g., Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 594.
95. 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 1580. The Federal Circuit upheld the trial court’s findings that there was no literal
infringement but that there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
97. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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modification may be separately patented may nonetheless infringe the claims
of the basic patent.”98
While recognizing blocking cases on improvements, these cases did not
address either the enablement requirement for the original patents or the
nonobviousness requirement for the improvement patents.99 The enablement
and written description requirements may place significant limitations on the
scope of claims in an original patent, and the nonobviousness requirement may
limit the validity of an improvement patent. Consequently, these requirements
may affect whether an improvement patent infringes an original patent. The
following section discusses the enablement, written description, and
nonobviousness requirements for blocking patents.
II. THE ENABLEMENT, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, AND NONOBVIOUSNESS
REQUIREMENTS
The requirement that a patent specification must include a description
sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention has
been a part of the patent law since the first patent statute of 1790.100 In 1847,
the Supreme Court ruled that, as a result of this requirement, a patent for a new
composition of matter would be void if the specification only identified the
substances that were to be combined without stating their relative proportions,
or if it stated the proportions ambiguously.101 Otherwise, “no one could use
the invention without first ascertaining by experiment the exact proportion of
the different ingredients required to produce the result intended to be
obtained.”102
Several years later, the Supreme Court applied the enablement requirement
to limit the permissible scope of patent claims in O’Reilly v. Morse,103 which
involved Samuel Morse’s patent for the telegraph.104 The Supreme Court
upheld the patent’s first seven claims, which referenced the description of the

98. Id. at 1563. For additional cases recognizing blocking patents on improvements, see 5
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 [1][a] (2009).
99. Atlas Powder did discuss enablement of the claims in the original patent and decided that
the enablement requirement was satisfied for them. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The improvement, however, did not
literally infringe those claims. Id. at 1579. Instead, the court found infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, and it ruled that the enablement requirement was not applicable to
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1580–81. Consequently, the court did not
address whether the defendant’s improvement was enabled by the specification in the original
patent. Id.
100. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (repealed 1793).
101. Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 5 (1847).
102. Id.
103. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 63 (1853).
104. Id. at 64.
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invention in the specification, and it affirmed the lower court’s injunction for
infringement of them.105 The Court also decided, however, that the eighth
claim was void for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement.106 In this last
claim, the patent sought to cover not only the particular invention described in
the specification, i.e. the telegraph, but also all improvements on it.107 The
claim read:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for making or
printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new
application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or
108
discoverer.

This claim would have covered future technologies, such as radio and
television, which Morse had not invented. The Court held that the patentee
claimed “what he has not described in the manner required by law,” and that “a
patent for such a claim is as strongly forbidden by the act of Congress, as if
some other person had invented it before him.”109
The enablement requirement also limited the permissible scope of claims
in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,110 which involved
a patent for incandescent lights issued to William E. Sawyer and Albon
Man.111 The specification described the invention as using an incandescent
conductor consisting “of carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material”
inside a transparent sealed vessel from which oxygen was excluded.112 The
patent had four claims, two of which are relevant here.113 The first claim was
for “[a]n incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized fibrous or
textile material, and of an arch or horseshoe shape, substantially as
hereinbefore set forth.”114 The third claim was for “[t]he incandescing
conductor for an electric lamp, formed of carbonized paper, substantially as
described.”115 The specification also said that in the practice of the invention,

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 112.
Id. at 113, 117.
Id. at 112.
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
Id. at 120.
159 U.S. 465 (1895).
Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 468.
Electric Light, 159 U.S. at 468.
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the inventors had used carbonized paper and wood carbon of varying shapes
and contours.116
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed the first claim by using an
incandescent light bulb supplied by the Edison Electric Company that had an
incandescent conductor made of bamboo.117 The Supreme Court decided that
the first claim violated the enablement requirement because it was
overbroad.118 It reasoned that the permissible scope of a claim depended on
how generic the relevant characteristic was over the range of the claim.119 The
Court explained:
If, for instance, minerals or porcelains had always been used for a particular
purpose, and a person should take out a patent for a similar article of wood,
and woods generally were adapted to that purpose, the claim might not be too
broad, though defendant used wood of a different kind from that of the
patentee. But if woods generally were not adapted to the purpose, and yet the
patentee had discovered a wood possessing certain qualities, which gave it a
peculiar fitness for such purpose, it would not constitute an infringement for
another to discover and use a different kind of wood, which was found to
120
contain similar or superior qualities.

The Court pointed out that Thomas Edison discovered that a particular species
of bamboo optimally served as an incandescent conductor in a light bulb only
after testing many types of plants over a period of several months.121 It
concluded that the specification did not enable persons skilled in the art to
practice the invention over the range of the first claim without a substantial
amount of experimentation, because the specification did not disclose which
fibrous or textile materials were suitable for use as an incandescent
conductor.122
The issue of the permissible scope of claims often arises with respect to
patents on chemical compositions where an inventor discovered one or more
particular compositions (i.e. species) and seeks to obtain a broader patent on a
category (i.e. a genus) of chemical compositions. For example, in Corona
Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.,123 the patented invention was a
process for vulcanizing rubber more rapidly using a particular chemical,
The patent included claims involving not only
diphenylguanidine.124
diphenylguanidine, but also the class of chemicals called disubstituted
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 467.
See id. at 468.
See id. at 472.
See id.
Electric Light, 159 U.S. at 472.
Id. at 472–73.
See id. at 475–76.
276 U.S. 358 (1928).
Id. at 365.
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guanidines, which included not only diphenylguanidine but also between fifty
and one-hundred other chemicals.125 Following Consolidated Electric Light,
the Supreme Court held that the claims for the class of disubstituted guanidines
was invalid, because the patentee made no showing that there was “any general
quality common to disubstituted guanidines which made them all effective” for
use in the process of the invention.126 The Court pointed out that a number of
the chemicals in the class that was claimed were not effective.127 In addition,
other members of the class had been discovered and used to accelerate the
process of vulcanizing rubber before the filing of the patent application.128
Corona Cord Tire suggests that a patentee must show that every species in
a class must have the characteristics needed for use in the invention in order
for the patentee to claim the genus. But courts have not required such a
showing as long as the specification is sufficient to enable a person of ordinary
skill in the art to make and use the invention over the range of the claim
without “undue experimentation.”129 In re Ellis provides an example.130 The
invention, a type of paint remover, contained solvents belonging to a class of
chemicals called ketonic derivatives of cyclic CH2 hydrocarbons.131 The
Patent Office sought to limit the claims to a particular solvent within the
class,132 but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia allowed the
patent to extend to the entire class.133 The court held that the specification with
its enumeration of numerous chemicals in the class was “sufficient to convey
to one skilled in the art the nature of the chemicals which will accomplish the
desired result.”134 It distinguished Consolidated Electric Light by explaining
that the chemicals in the designated class had the common quality of being
solvents and were suitable for use in the invention.135
Similarly, in In re Angstadt,136 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
upheld a claim for a process that involved using catalysts selected from a class
of chemicals.137 The specification disclosed forty examples of species that
were tested out of thousands of species of chemicals within the genus, and the

125. See id. at 385.
126. Id. at 385.
127. See id.
128. Corona Cord Tire, 276 U.S. at 382–83, 385.
129. See, e.g., In re Gray, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
130. 37 App. D.C. 203 (1911). For additional discussion of Ellis, see C. H. Biesterfeld,
Breadth and Scope of Chemical Claims, 2 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 598, 602–05 (1919).
131. Ellis, 37 App. D.C. at 204–05.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 207.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 208–09.
136. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
137. Id. at 499, 501.
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specification also stated that some of the species would not work in the
process.138 The court explained that the process in the invention was not
complicated, and therefore, a person skilled in the particular art could take the
specification with its forty examples and readily determine which of the
species within the scope of the claims would work and which would not.139
The court held that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the
invention over the range of the claims without undue experimentation, and that
the key word was “undue,” rather than “experimentation.”140
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided in Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.141 that a claim for the genus of all the
DNA sequences for proteins that were sufficiently duplicative of a particular
protein with 165 amino acids was invalid for lack of enablement.142 The court
noted that the patentee had made only fifty to eighty examples of the millions
of possible DNA sequences that could be within the genus, and after five years
of experimentation, the plaintiff was not able to determine which of the
millions of possible DNA sequences actually were within the claim.143 The
court distinguished Angstadt on the grounds that the patentee had not provided
“a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the
invention commensurate with the scope of his claims,” which in the context of
DNA sequences meant “disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to
justify grant of the claims sought.”144
As the court explained in Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,145 enablement
requires more than “[t]ossing out the mere germ of an idea” or “vague
intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.”146 The
specification does not have to include a working example147 or disclose what
would already be known to those skilled in the art,148 but it does need to
provide enough information to enable persons skilled in the art to carry out the

138. Id. at 205.
139. Id. at 503.
140. Id. at 503–04.
141. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 1203, 1212–13.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1213. See also In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting a
single example in specification for producing one mammalian protein in one plant species did not
provide sufficient information to enable broad claims for producing any type of mammalian
protein in any plant species); In re Vacek, 947 F.2d 488, 495–96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the
disclosure of nine genera of cyanobacteria in specification with working example for only one
species did not enable claim for all 150 genera of cyanobacteria).
145. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
146. Id. at 1366.
147. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
148. Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366.
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invention without undue experimentation.149 The Federal Circuit has noted
that whether a specification requires undue experimentation to practice an
invention depends on the following factors:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of
those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
150
breadth of the claims.

In addition to requiring a patent specification to enable a person of skill in
the art to make and use the invention as claimed, the Federal Circuit also
requires the specification to include a written description of the invention.151
One major purpose of the written description requirement is to establish that
the patent applicant had possession of what the applicant claimed as the
invention on the date of filing the application.152 Another purpose is to prevent
an applicant from amending claims and have the claims relate back to an
earlier filing date in order to gain priority of invention over a competing
applicant.153
There is a large amount of overlap between the written description and
enablement requirements, because a written description of the invention will
often enable a person of skill in the art to make and use the invention.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has noted the following distinctions between
the two requirements:
[A]n invention may be described without an enabling disclosure of how to
make and use it. A description of a chemical compound without a description
of how to make and use it, unless within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the
art, is an example. Moreover, an invention may be enabled even though it has

149. Id. at 1365.
150. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
151. For a summary of the historical background of the written description requirement, see
In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591–93 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
152. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v.
Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Enzo-Bichem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d
956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
see also In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967). But see Timothy R. Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161–63 (2006) (arguing that possession of the
invention should be established through proof of enablement rather than the written description
requirement).
153. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The written
description requirement prevents applicants from using the amendment process to update their
disclosures (claims or specifications) during their pendency before the patent office.”); see also
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Robert P. Merges,
Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1651–56
(2007) (urging that the written description requirement should be limited to “misappropriation by
amendment” cases such as Gentry Gallery).
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not been described. Such can occur when enablement of a closely related
invention A that is both described and enabled would similarly enable an
invention B if B were described. A specification can likewise describe an
154
invention without enabling the practice of the full breadth of its claims.

Because the enablement requirement relies on what would be apparent to
persons skilled in the art, it closely parallels the modern standard for
nonobviousness. As provided in 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is not
patentable “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.”155
Before § 103 was adopted in 1952, however, the standard for patentability
revolved around the concept of invention, which was described as “inherently
elusive,”156 and it appeared to evolve over time.157 In an early case, Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood,158 the Supreme Court ruled that a patent for an improved
doorknob made of clay, rather than wood or metal, was invalid because it
involved merely the substitution of a known material for others.159 It held:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful
160
mechanic, not that of the inventor.

The emphasis in Hotchkiss on “invention” as a requirement for patentability
caused confusion in the courts and created uncertainty in the applicability of
this standard for patentability.161

154. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921–22 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
156. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151 (1950); see
also Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952
Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 859–62 (1964) (noting vagueness of the “requirement for
invention” that evolved out of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood).
157. Edmond W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP.
CT. REV. 293, 303 (1966).
158. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
159. Id. at 262.
160. Id. at 267.
161. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (“The truth is the word [invention]
cannot be defined in such a manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a
particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”); Monroe Auto Equip. Co.
v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 1964) (“It is virtually a practical
impossibility to define adequately that abstraction which we call invention.”); Trabon Eng’g
Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943) (“Long experience with assailed inventions in
trial and on review led us in humility to the conclusion that the inventive concept is an abstraction
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By tying it directly to the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in
the art, § 103 clarified the standard for patentability. As a consequence, the
scope of enablement for the patent for an original invention (i.e. that which is
within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the art) closely tracks the scope of
patentability for an improvement to the original invention under the
nonobvious requirement (i.e., whether the differences between the
improvement and the original invention would have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art). Since a person having ordinary skill in the art
is presumed to have known of the specification for the original invention,162
there would seem to be little room for a patent on an improvement to be both
within the scope of enablement for the patent on the original invention and
nonobvious.
One possibility might be that the scope of patentability for an improvement
could extend beyond what is nonobvious on account of the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents arose to prevent a fraud on a patent
by a copyist making insubstantial changes to a patented invention to take it
outside of the literal scope of its claims.163 A device is typically infringing
under the doctrine of equivalents “if it performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result”164 as a patented
invention, even though the device and patented invention may “differ in name,
form, or shape.”165 The Supreme Court has noted, “An important factor [in
determining equivalency] is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in
the patent with one that was.”166
Even with the doctrine of equivalents, though, the scope of patent
protection for an original invention generally should not extend to cover
nonobvious improvements. The purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to
cover insignificant modifications of the original invention that do not
impossible to define . . . .”); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 639 (2d Cir. 1942)
(“‘Invention,’ for patent purposes, has been difficult to define. Efforts to cage the concept in
words have proved almost as unsuccessful as attempts verbally to imprison the concept
‘beautiful.’”); Warren Telechron Co. v. Waltham Watch Co., 91 F.2d 472, 473 (1st Cir. 1937)
(“The quality which constitutes invention is indefinable, as has often been said. . . . It is a matter
of feeling rather than of logic.”).
162. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary
skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”);
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art who is referred to in § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act
who must be presumed to have, or is charged with having, knowledge of all material prior art.”).
163. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
164. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
165. Id. at 608 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
166. Id. at 609 (quoted in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25
(1997)).
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substantially affect its function or the way the invention, as modified,
accomplishes its results.167 Generally, an improvement based upon such
changes would be obvious to persons of skill in the art and would therefore not
qualify for a patent. For example, in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., the Court found that the defendant’s substitution of
manganese for magnesium in the patented welding flux was infringing under
the doctrine of equivalents.168 The Court emphasized that persons familiar
with welding fluxes were aware, and the chemical literature confirmed, that
manganese could be substituted for magnesium in welding fluxes.169 It is
therefore inconceivable that the defendant in Graver Tank could have obtained
a patent for a welding flux with manganese that would have satisfied the
nonobviousness requirement.
The doctrine of equivalents, however, may extend the scope of patent
protection to cover not only unclaimed variations of an original invention that
were well known at the time the patent was filed, such as the welding flux in
Graver Tank, but also after-arising technologies.170 Although after-arising
technologies may not be within the present grasp of persons of ordinary skill in
the art, persons of ordinary skill in the art may have the capability of adapting
present inventions to after-arising technologies when they eventually come online.
For example, the Federal Circuit upheld claims to reach after-arising
technology in Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.171 The claims in
issue were for interactive television program guides that allowed viewers to
search through a large volume of broadcasted television information without
having to wait for the information to scroll down to them on their television
screens.172 The claims involved mixing a “regularly received television signal”
with search instructions from television viewers through a remote control
167. Id. at 607–09.
168. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
169. Id. at 612.
170. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (designating after-arising technologies as a “quintessential example of an enforceable
equivalent”).
171. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For additional decisions stating that claims may cover
after-arising technology, see Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.3d 1363, 1371–72
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our case law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the
literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough.”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The
claims can therefore be construed to cover later developed technology that was unavailable but
known at the time of the invention.”). See also Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc.,
491 F.2d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that a patent for using a narrow collimated beam of
light to lay sewer pipe was infringed by a device that used a laser even though lasers did not exist
when the patent application was filed).
172. Superguide, 358 F.3d at 873.
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system and a microprocessor.173 The claims did not specify whether the
television signals were in analog or digital format, but the trial court ruled that
the claims were limited to analog television signals, because analog television
signals were the only type of television signals that were broadcast at the time
the patent was filed.174 The Federal Circuit reversed, giving the claims a broad
construction that included both analog and digital signals, combinations of
them, and even signals in other formats.175 The Federal Circuit observed that
although analog was the dominant format for television signals at the time of
filing, persons of skill in the art were aware then that video data could be
communicated in either analog or digital format.176 While the Superguide
decision was concerned with claim interpretation and did not expressly address
enablement, it would seem that the enablement requirement would also have
been satisfied, since the specification would have enabled persons of ordinary
skill in the art to adapt the invention to a digital format.
Similarly, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,177 the Federal Circuit
ruled that a patent for an apparatus controlling the velocity and orientation of a
satellite was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.178 The claims stated
that the apparatus included means for sending data of the satellite’s location
and orientation to an external source and means for receiving control signals
from the external source to alter the satellite’s velocity and orientation.179 At
the time of filing of the patent application, computers were too large to be
placed on satellites.180 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that a satellite
using a later developed on-board computer for controlling the satellite’s
velocity and orientation was infringing because it performed “the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the
apparatus described in the patent.181 The Federal Circuit noted that once onboard computers became available, any intelligent engineer could adapt the
apparatus described in the patent to using them for controlling the satellite.182
The improvement of using an on-board computer in the original patent would
not have been patentable, because the improvement would have been obvious

173. Id. at 875.
174. Id. at 876–77.
175. Id. at 878.
176. Id. at 879. The specification also did not differentiate between analog and digital
signals, but instead referred to regular received television signals as “video data.” Id.
177. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
178. Id. at 1366.
179. Id. at 1355.
180. See id. at 1364–65 (noting on-board computers required time to be developed).
181. Id. at 1365. See also Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 326 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[A]n embellishment’ made possible by technological advances may not permit an
accused device to escape ‘the web of infringement.”).
182. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364–65.
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to a person of ordinary skill in the art once on-board computers became
available. Therefore, there could not be blocking patents between the original
invention and the improvement.
Even though the doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of infringement
beyond the scope of a patent’s claims, it will not provide an opportunity for
blocking patents to arise because improvements within the range of the
doctrine of equivalents will not be patentable. The range of the doctrine of
equivalents is limited to variations that must perform the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result. These variations would
be obvious to persons of ordinary skill in the art, however, with respect to
after-arising technology.183
Another possible way in which the claims of a patent might be able to
extend to nonobvious after-arising technology involves the timing of
enablement.184 A line of cases have ruled that the enablement requirement was
satisfied with respect to species that were within the scope of a claim to a
genus and were unknown at the time of the filing of a patent application so
long as the specification enabled all the species in the genus that were known
at the time of filing.185 These cases produced the paradigm example of
blocking patents in recent times. They arose out of the invention of crystalline
polypropylene in the early 1950s and the epic litigation that came in its wake.
The next section examines the polypropylene litigation and the paradoxical

183. In Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., the Federal Circuit held: “It is
not a requirement of equivalence, however, that those skilled in the art know of the equivalence
when the patent application is filed or the patent issues. That question is determined as of the
time infringement takes place.” 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court did not suggest,
however, that an improvement within the range of the doctrine of equivalents would satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement for patentability at the time that the improvement was first
developed. Rather, its ruling only addressed whether the improvement would have been known
to those skilled in the art at the times that the patent was filed and issued. Id.
184. See Hugh McTavish, Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 121, 139 n.118 (2001) (“Blocking patents arise because of [the] point in time at which
enablement is judged.”).
185. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“[C]ertainly, the disclosure of specifics adds to the understanding one skilled in the art
would glean from a generic term, but it does not follow that such added disclosure limits the
meaning thereof.”) (citation omitted); Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356, 362 (3d
Cir. 1981) (“Generally, in determining entitlement to a patent when there are contending
inventors, priority is awarded to the party who first reduced to practice a conception of the
invention if all other conditions of patentability are satisfied.”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting patents of a subsequent improvement should not be “utilize[d] . . . to
‘reach back’ and preclude or invalidate a patent on the underlying invention”); Phillips Petroleum
Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1357 (D. Del. 1987) (“It is the burden of an alleged
infringer not merely to demonstrate that it is better but to demonstrate that it is in fact a different
product. Defendants have wholly failed to do this.”); Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 494 F.
Supp. 370, 374–76 (D. Del. 1980).
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produced during the oil refining process.195 Although it has some use as a fuel
gas and also for producing other chemicals, propylene’s primary use today is in
producing polypropylene.196 Propylene is composed entirely of carbon (C) and
hydrogen (H) atoms, and its chemical formula is C3H6.197 The chemical
structure for propylene is represented as follows:

Figure 3. Propylene Structure
The double line between the carbon atoms (labeled 1 and 2) represents a
double bond, while the single lines between the other parts of the structure
represent single bonds. The unit labeled CH3 is called a methyl group (CH4 is
methane), and like the hydrogen atoms, the methyl group has a single bond
with a carbon atom. Double bonds are more reactive than single bonds, and so
chemical reactions are more likely to occur in molecules with double bonds.198
Polymerization of propylene to form polypropylene is accomplished by
replacing the double bond between the carbon atoms with a single bond
between them and a released bond which may then attach to other molecular
units to form a polymer chain as shown below.199 Usually, a catalyst is used to
induce the chemical reactions for the formation of polymers.200
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Figure 4. Atactic Polypropylene
It should be noted that every two carbon atoms in the chain have three
hydrogen atoms and one methyl group attached to them so that together they
form C3H6. In addition, some of the methyl groups lie above the central
195. Id.
196. ICIS.com, Propylene CAS No: 115-07-1, http://www.icis.com/v2/chemicals/9076453/
propylene.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
197. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1284–85 (D.
Del. 1987).
198. Id. at 1285.
199. CLIVE MAIER & TERESA CALAFUT, POLYPROPYLENE: THE DEFINITIVE USER’S GUIDE
AND DATABOOK 3 (1998).
200. Id.
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carbon chain, while some of them are below the chain. Molecules of
polypropylene in which the methyl groups are randomly arranged above and
below the carbon chain are called atactic polypropylene.201 Prior to the early
1950s, the only form of polypropylene that had been produced was amorphous
polypropylene, which is formed from atactic molecules of polypropylene.202
Amorphous polypropylene is a liquid at room temperature,203 and therefore
does not exhibit the useful qualities of polypropylene as we know it today.
In isotatic polypropylene all the methyl groups are arranged on the same
side of the central carbon atom chain, as shown below.204 Formation of
isotactic polypropylene is achieved through the use of particular catalysts that
control the orientation of the propylene molecules as they are lined up in the
polymer chain.205
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Figure 5. Isotactic Polypropylene
With all the methyl groups on the same side of the central carbon chain, the
molecules coil up into helixes and then the molecules are able to form crystals
as shown in the microphotograph of crystalline polypropylene below.206 When
the crystals form, the polypropylene molecules pack together into a tight,
regular array called a crystal lattice.207

201. The terms “atactic” and “isotactic” originated with Giulio Natta’s wife, Rosita Natta,
who happened to be a language scholar and semanticist. Karl Ziegler, Consequences and
Development of an Invention, in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY 1963–1970 12 (1972); FRANK
M. MCMILLAN, THE CHAIN STRAIGHTENERS: FRUITFUL INNOVATION: THE DISCOVERY OF
LINEAR AND STEREOREGULAR SYNTHETIC POLYMERS 127 (1979).
202. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1316. The amorphous polypropylene was also tree-branched,
rather than arranged in a linear chain. Id.
203. Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 416 (D. Del. 1980) (“In the
polymerization of propylene over commonly used catalysts, such as phosphoric acid and nickel
on silica-alumina, the polymer produced is liquid and contains little, if any, solid polymer.”).
204. MAIER & CALAFUT, supra note 199, at 4.
205. Id.
206. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1286.
207. Id.
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Figure 6. Microphotograph of Polypropylene
The formation of the crystal lattice has a “very profound effect upon the
physical properties” of the polypropylene.208 The ordered arrangement of the
crystal lattice causes the polypropylene to become a solid up to its melting
point of 320º F and imparts strength to the material.209 The attractive forces in
the crystal lattice also make the polypropylene impervious to solvents and
acids that would otherwise cause it to dissolve.210
The synthesis of crystalline polypropylene was a major scientific
achievement. The discovery is described in the Encyclopedia Britannica as
follows:
It is generally accepted that isotactic polypropylene was discovered in 1954 by
the Italian chemist Giulio Natta and his assistant Paolo Chini, working in
association with Montecatini (now Montedison SpA) and employing catalysts
of the type recently invented by Karl Ziegler for synthesizing polyethylene.
(Partly in recognition of this achievement, Natta was awarded the Nobel Prize
211
for Chemistry in 1963 along with Ziegler.)

B.

The Natta Patent

Karl Ziegler was a prominent German professor who was the director of
the Max Planck Institute for Coal Research in Mülheim, Germany.212 After
two decades of research on organic compounds of metals, Professor Ziegler
discovered during World War II an Aufbau (“growth”) reaction in which a
particular metal-organic compound induced the growth of linear chains of

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id. at 1286–87 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Industrial Polymers, Major, in 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 315 (15th ed. 2007).
Biography Karl Ziegler, in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY, supra note 201, at 25.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

86

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:55

ethylene molecules.213 This research eventually led to his synthesis of
polyethylene, another major plastic, in 1953. 214
Giulio Natta was professor and director of the Department of Industrial
Chemistry at the Milan Polytechnic, and his area of research was hydrocarbon
chemistry.215 After hearing a lecture by Professor Ziegler in 1952, Professor
Natta realized that the catalysts that Ziegler had discovered could be used to
produce linear chains from other organic compounds.216 Natta arranged with
the Montecatini Chemical Company, Italy’s largest chemical company, to
invite Ziegler to a meeting in Milan to discuss his research.217 That meeting
led to an agreement in which Montecatini purchased rights for the commercial
development of Ziegler’s research in Italy and Natta was given access to
Ziegler’s research.218 The research and licensing agreement between Ziegler
and Montecatini also provided for three of Natta’s research assistants
(nicknamed the “Three Bright Boys”) to visit Ziegler’s laboratory in Mülheim,
Germany beginning in February of 1953.219 Natta’s research assistants
followed the synthesis of polyethylene in Professor Ziegler’s laboratory in
1953.220
Paolo Chini was one of these research assistants.221 After returning to
Milan, he repeated certain experiments that Ziegler described in his German
patent, and was struck by the ease with which he was able to polymerize
ethylene using a particular mixture of catalysts (which are now known as the
Ziegler-Natta catalysts).222 On March 11, 1954, Natta instructed Chini to use
the same catalysts with propylene, whereupon Chini reported that he had
produced solid polypropylene.223 Further experiments were conducted in the
spring of 1954, and Natta forwarded them to the Patent Department at

213. MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 38–39; PETER J.T. MORRIS, POLYMER PIONEERS 22, 79
(1986).
214. Professor Ziegler drafted his own patent application for producing polyethylene, titled
“Process of the Polymerization of Ehylene,” and he filed it with the German Patent Office on
November 17, 1953. HEINZ MARTIN, POLYMERS, PATENTS, PROFITS: A CLASSIC CASE STUDY
FOR PATENT INFIGHTING: KARL ZIEGLER, THE TEAM, 1953-1998 14 (2007).
215. NOBLE LECTURES, supra note 201, at 63; MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 53.
216. MORRIS, supra note 213, at 82; Giulio Natta, From the Stereospecific Polymerization to
the Asymmetric Autocatalytic Synthesis of Macromoleculoes, in NOBLE LECTURES, CHEMISTRY,
supra note 201, at 28.
217. MORRIS, supra note 213, at 82.
218. MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 54.
219. Id. at 95.
220. MARTIN, supra note 214, at 13–14.
221. MCMILLIAN, supra note 201, at 95.
222. The Ziegler-Natta catalysts are a mixture of various chemicals, which include titanium
tetrachloride and triethyl aluminum. Id.
223. MARTIN, supra note 214, at 21; MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 95.
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Montecatini.224 On June 8, 1954, Montecatini filed a patent application
claiming the polymerization of propylene with the Italian Patent Office that
named Natta as the sole inventor.225 On December 10, 1954, Natta submitted a
paper describing his discovery of crystalline polypropylene to the Journal of
the American Chemical Society, and the paper was published on March 20,
1955.226
C. The Hogan and Banks Patent
Although Ziegler and Natta were the first to synthesize polypropylene, and
shared the 1963 Nobel Prize for doing so, the Phillips Petroleum Company was
awarded a blocking patent in the United States that was given priority over
Montecatini’s patent.227 In 1951, J. Paul Hogan and Robert L. Banks were
chemists working in the research laboratory at Phillips Petroleum on
converting petroleum gases into gasoline.228 One of their experiments
involved passing propylene through a one-inch tube packed with a catalyst to
which a chromium salt had been added.229 The experiment failed because their
tube became clogged with a waxy substance.230 A similar effect had been
observed by chemists at Shell Development Corporation, who were trying to
develop synthetic rubber during World War II; but the Shell chemists thought
the substance they observed was a nuisance, and they abandoned their
experiment.231 In contrast, Hogan and Banks were able to persuade Phillips’s
management to allow them to investigate the mysterious substance.232 Hogan
and Banks conducted a series of experiments in their laboratory using a
catalyst composed of a support of silica and alumina impregnated with
chromium oxide that eventually became known as the Marlex catalyst.233 “On

224. MARTIN, supra note 214, at 23.
225. Id. Professor Ziegler’s laboratory produced polypropylene shortly afterwards, and
Professor Ziegler sent Professor Natta a sample. Professor Ziegler was shocked to learn a few
days later that Professor Natta’s laboratory had already polymerized propylene. Id.; MCMILLAN,
supra note 201, at 104. A compromise was eventually worked out in which Professor Ziegler and
Montecatini divided the licensing royalties from polypropylene 70/30. Id. at 105.
226. Giulio Natta et al., Crystalline High Polymers of α-Olefins, 77 J. AM. CHEM. SOC’Y 1708
(1955); See also Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1338 (D. Del.
1987).
227. MORRIS, supra note 213, at 23 (“[W]hile legal priority for the discovery of stereoregular
polypropylene has been granted to Phillips Petroleum, the scientific honors—as evidenced by the
joint award of the 1963 Noble Prize—belong to Karl Ziegler and Giulio Natta.”).
228. MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 69–70.
229. Id.
230. Id. Hogan and Banks described the substance as a “heavy waxy polymer” and a “unique
solid material” with a “tacky, latex-like nature.” Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1337.
231. MCMILLAN, supra note 201, at 69–70.
232. See CARRAHER, supra note 187, at 199.
233. See id.
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March 14, 1952, [they] submitted a Disclosure of Invention [form] to the
Phillips Patent Department . . . [describing their invention as] a ‘process for the
production of propylene polymers’, ‘improved polymer products from
propylene, 1-butene and other monoalkylethylenes’ and a ‘new catalyst for
polymerization.’”234 The Patent Department requested additional information,
and on November 26, 1952, Hogan provided the characteristics for the solid
polypropylene that he had produced:
melting point °F:

240–280

density:

0.90–0.95

intrinsic viscosity:

0.2–1.0

weight average
molecular weight:

5,000–20,000.235

The Hogan and Banks patent application, entitled “Solid Polymers of
Olefins,”236 was filed on January 27, 1953.237 The application contained the
information that Hogan provided concerning melting point and average
molecular weight.238 Unlike Natta’s patent application, the Hogan and Banks
application failed to identify the polypropylene as crystalline, and it did not
describe the mechanism for the formation of isotactic polypropylene in terms
of aligning the methyl groups on the same side of the central carbon chain.239
The Assistant Director of Research at Phillips, Dr. William Reynolds,
became aware of Natta’s article in the Journal of the American Chemical
Society shortly after its publication.240 Although the article did not identify the
catalysts that Natta used, Reynolds was able to speculate what they were—and
he suggested that Phillips should investigate the Ziegler-Natta process.241
Chemists at Phillips conducted experiments with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts in
the spring of 1955, and succeeded in producing crystalline polypropylene in
May and June.242 While these experiments were conducted, Reynolds
234. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1337.
235. Id.
236. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Olefin is a term used for alkenes,
which are hydrocarbons with at least one carbon to carbon double bond. Alkenes have the
general formula CnH2n and include ethylene (C2H4) as well as propylene (C3H6). L.G. WADE, JR.,
ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 279 (Nicole Folchetti ed., Pearson Prentice Hall 6th ed. 2006); G.P. Moss
et al., Glossary of Class Names of Organic Compounds and Reactive Intermediates Based on
Structure (IUPAC Recommendations 1995), 67 PURE & APPLIED CHEMISTRY 1307, 1313 (1995).
237. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1284.
238. Id. at 1290.
239. Id. at 1286.
240. Id. at 1338.
241. Id.
242. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1338.
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observed: “The more I see of the so called Ziegler polymerization the more I
am of the opinion that this process represents one of the most basic catalytic
process discoveries in many years. The process is undoubtedly far more
general and versatile than demonstrated for MARLEX.”243 Meanwhile, in the
summer and fall of 1955, other chemists at Phillips were studying the
polypropylene produced with the Marlex catalyst that Hogan and Banks had
used.244 They determined that it was an isotactic polymer, but that it was
brittle, because its highest molecular weight was around 30,000, and molecular
weights above 50,000 were required for the polypropylene to be flexible.245
The Phillips chemists advised the Patent Department of their conclusions
and also that others, including Natta, were claiming that they had invented
crystalline polypropylene.246 Phillips then decided to file a new application247
in order to provoke an interference248 so that the United States Patent Office
would determine which company had priority for the invention.249 While
Phillips thought that its 1953 application described crystalline polypropylene,
it was concerned that the word “crystalline” did not appear anywhere in the
application.250 Therefore, on January 11, 1956, Phillips filed its continuationin-part application251 in which it included the claim: “Normally solid
polypropylene consisting essentially of recurring propylene units, having a
substantial crystalline polypropylene content.”252 The 1956 application

243. Id. at 1339.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006) (stating that an inventor who has previously filed a patent
application may file a new application while the first application is pending and obtain the benefit
of the filing date of the first application for the new application if it contains a reference to the
first application).
248. Interferences are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006).
249. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1339.
250. Id.
251. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b)(2) (2008) (“A continuation-in-part application (which may
disclose and claim subject matter not disclosed in the prior application) . . . .”). Any new matter
in the continuation-in-part application will not receive the priority date for the original
application. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
1999):
Subject matter that arises for the first time in the CIP [continuation-in-part] application
does not receive the benefit of the filing date of the parent application. Thus, the decision
on the proper priority date—the parent application date or the CIP application date—for
subject matter claimed in a CIP application depends on when that subject matter first
appeared in the patent disclosures. To decide this question, a court must examine whether
the “disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably convey[s] to the artisan that the
inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter.”
(citation omitted).
252. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1286.
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differed significantly from the 1953 application. In addition to adding
references to crystalline polymers and crystalline polypropylenes, Phillips
broadened the ranges of melting points from 240–300°F to 240–320°F, and the
range of weight average molecular weights from 5000–20,000 to 900–50,000
and higher.253 In addition, Phillips added four descriptive examples of the
invention to the application; the last example called for the use of the ZieglerNatta catalysts—triethyl aluminum and titanium tetrachloride. 254
On September 9, 1958, the United States Patent Office instituted and
declared an interference to authorize the Board of Patent Interferences to
determine which of five competing companies was entitled to priority of
invention for crystalline polypropylene.255 Three decades of massive litigation
then ensued. The 1960s were spent “in an incredibly involved program of
discovery.”256 Finally, on November 29, 1971, after hearing testimony from
126 witnesses, the Board issued a 113-page decision257 awarding priority to
Montedison for Natta’s patent.258 The litigation continued with the three
losing parties filing civil actions to challenge the Board’s decision.259 If
anything, the litigation seemed to become more acrimonious as the plaintiffs
were permitted to amend their complaints to add charges, which had not been
raised in the interference, that Montedison had committed fraud by deliberately
misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts in the filing and
prosecution of its patent applications.260
After an eighty-five day trial, the district court issued a ninety-one-page
decision awarding priority to Phillips for the invention of crystalline

253. Id. at 1340.
254. Id.
255. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 540 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1976). The five
companies were Phillips Petroleum Company, Montedison, S.p.A. (the successor to Montecatini
Chemical Company), E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, Standard Oil Company and
Hercules, Inc. Id. at 614 n.4. The Board rendered judgment on the issue of priority against
Hercules, Inc. on October 6, 1964. Id.
256. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 398 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Del. 1975), vacated,
540 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally Montecatini Edison S.p.A. v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 434 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1970); Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969); In re
Natta, 410 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1969); Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968); Natta v. Hogan,
392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968); Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d
615 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Hogan, 309 F. Supp. 945 (D. Del. 1970); In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319 (D.
Del. 1969); Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1967); In re Natta, 264 F. Supp. 734 (D.
Del. 1967); In re Natta, 259 F. Supp. 922 (D. Del. 1966).
257. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D. Del. 1980).
258. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 540 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir. 1976).
259. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 431 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1977).
260. Id. at 1072. Plaintiffs were not allowed to add allegations of Montedison’s
“brainwashing” or exerting improper influence on patent examiners, however. Id. at 1071.
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polypropylene.261 The district court determined the date of priority for
Montedison to be June 8, 1954, which was the date that Natta filed his patent
application with the Italian Patent Office.262 Although Natta did not file his
United States patent application until June 8, 1955, the United States patent
application related back to the filing of the Italian patent application pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 119, because Natta filed the United States patent application
within one year of the filing of the Italian patent application.263
The district court based the date of priority for Phillips on the original
filing of the Hogan and Banks patent application on January 27, 1953.264
While Phillips abandoned the 1953 patent application when it filed its
continuation-in-part application on January 11, 1956, the date of priority for
the continuation-in-part application related back to the date of the original
patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 120 with respect to any disclosures made
in the original patent application.265 In order for the 1956 continuation-in-part
application to relate back to 1953, though, the 1953 disclosure would have to
satisfy the enablement requirement for the invention.266 The Board of Patent
Interferences had rejected the earlier date on the grounds that the 1953 patent
application failed to disclose crystalline polypropylene and failed to disclose a
utility for the material.267 The district court ruled, however, that the 1953
application satisfied the requirements for the 1956 continuation-in-part
application to relate back to 1953,268 because the 1953 application disclosed
four experiments that Hogan and Banks conducted which produced solid
propylene polymers with a substantially crystalline polypropylene content.269

261. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370 (D. Del. 1980).
262. Id. at 386.
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 119 (2006).
264. Standard Oil, 494 F. Supp. at 411.
265. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). See also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen reliance is
on a patent document already filed, the question is whether the document discloses the invention
of the count by meeting the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶
1, for a filed application serves as a constructive reduction to practice of its content.”).
267. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 411 (D. Del. 1980).
268. Id. The district court stated “that the 1953 application was an adequate constructive
reduction to practice.” Id. This is equivalent to saying that it satisfied the enablement
requirement. See Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“It goes
without saying that proof of a constructive reduction to practice would also require that the
specification be sufficient to enable anyone skilled in the art to make the invention, i.e., the ‘how
to make’ requirement of section 112 should also be met by the specification.”). The district also
ruled that the 1953 satisfied the utility requirement for patentability because Phillips recognized
that its crystalline polypropylene could be used as a wax modifier. Standard Oil, 494 F. Supp. at
411.
269. Standard Oil, 494 F. Supp. at 412–18.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.270 The appellate court began its
analysis with the description of the invention in the interference count:
“Normally solid polypropylene, consisting essentially of recurring propylene
units, having a substantial crystalline polypropylene content.”271 It then parsed
the phrases in the interference count one at a time. Montedison and the other
appellants “concede[d] that the 1953 application disclosed a solid
polypropylene,” but challenged whether the polypropylene it disclosed
consisted “essentially of recurring propylene units” and whether the
polypropylene had “a substantial crystalline content.”272 The 1953 application
did not expressly state that the material produced in Hogan and Banks’
experiments consisted of recurring propylene units,273 but the district court
concluded that the application inherently disclosed this fact.274 The appellate
court decided that this conclusion was supported by expert testimony that a
polymer chemist, in 1953, would have recognized that polypropylene produced
under the conditions of their experiments would consist of essentially recurring
propylene units.275 The appellate court similarly agreed with the district
court’s conclusion that the 1953 application inherently disclosed that the
polypropylene was crystalline.276 It ruled this conclusion was supported by
expert testimony that a skilled polymer chemist would have concluded the
material was crystalline after reading the information in the disclosure that the
material was not soluble in pentane at room temperature, as well as the data
provided concerning the material’s melting temperature, viscosity, density, and
molecular weight.277
D. In re Hogan
While the courts were reviewing the massive interference over the
invention of polypropylene, a significant ruling was made on a related patent.
The original Hogan and Banks patent application included claims for not only
polypropylene but also for a solid polymer of another hydrocarbon called 4methyl-1-pentene (C6H12), which has the repeating chemical structure shown
below.278

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Standard Oil, 664 F.2d at 366.
Id. at 371.
Id.
In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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Figure 7. Structure of 4-methyl-1-pentene279
After the action to review the interference was filed in the district court,
Phillips decided to divide the claims for polypropylene and 4-methyl-1-pentene
into separate patent applications by filing divisional applications pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 121 for the separate inventions.280 The Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) rejected claims 13–15 in the successor to the divisional application
for 4-methyl-1-pentene.281 Claim 13 was for “[a] normally solid homopolymer
of 4-methyl-1-pentene,” and claims 14 and 15 were narrower dependent claims
that incorporated claim 13 by reference.282 Among the grounds that the patent
examiner gave for rejecting these claims was that the claims for the polymer
were broader than the scope of enablement, because they included other
species of the polymer that were the subjects of subsequent patents.283 The
Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the PTO’s rejection of the claims.284 Among
the reasons given by the Board was that the disclosure in the original 1953
Hogan and Banks application was not enabling, because the disclosure was
limited to making crystalline polymers but the claims the Board was rejecting
“encompasse[d] an amorphous polymer as well, which is manifestly outside
the scope of the enabling teaching present in the case.”285

279. Id. at 597 n.4.
280. Id. at 597 n.3.
281. Id. at 597. After filing the divisional application in 1967, Phillips filed a continuation
application to the divisional in 1971. Id. The rejected claims were actually in the 1971
continuation application, rather than the 1967 divisional application. See id.
282. Id. at 597–98.
283. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 600.
284. Id. at 601.
285. Id. The Board’s decision appears factually incorrect. Amorphous polymers were known
in the prior art, and therefore, they did not need to be disclosed to enable a person of ordinary
skill in the art to make them. The original 1953 application included references to patents from
1937 and 1945 for processes for producing amorphous polymers. See also U.S. Patent No.
2,085,525 (issued June 29, 1937); U.S. Patent No. 2,387,784 (issued Oct. 30, 1945). In addition,
its specification identifies amorphous polymers as the prior art:
A further characteristic of polymers according to this invention is that they have relatively
high densities as compared with the predominantly amorphous polymers produced by the
prior art. Another characteristic of the polymers according to this invention is that they
have relatively high melting points in comparison with prior art amorphous polymers.
U.S. Patent No. 4,342,854 col. 1 (issued Aug. 3, 1982).
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On appeal to the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals,286 the court reversed
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals.287 The court ruled that the patent
examiner and board erred by considering a later state of the art (i.e., patents
filed after the filing of the 1953 application) to decide whether the claims
satisfied the enablement requirement.288 The court reasoned:
The PTO has not challenged appellants’ assertion that their 1953 application
enabled those skilled in the art in 1953 to make and use “a solid polymer” as
described in claim 13. Appellants disclosed, as the only then existing way to
make such a polymer, a method of making the crystalline form. To now say
that appellants should have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on
this record did not exist until 1962, would be to impose an impossible burden
on inventors and thus on the patent system. There cannot, in an effective patent
system, be such a burden placed on the right to broad claims. To restrict
appellants to the crystalline form disclosed, under such circumstances, would
be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad
protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both shortsighted and unsound from
the standpoint of promoting progress in the useful arts, the constitutional
289
purpose of the patent laws.

The court appears to have envisioned the situation that claim 13 for a solid
polymer covered two forms for it: a crystalline form that was enabled by the
specification of the 1953 application and an amorphous form that was not
enabled because it was discovered later.290 Since it seemed to the court that the
amorphous form did not exist at the time of the patent application, the patentee
could not have been expected to claim the amorphous form at that time.291
These circumstances were distinguishable from those in Consolidated
Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,292 because the patentees in the
latter case were aware when they filed their application that some types of
carbon made from vegetable fibrous materials would not work in their

286. Before the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1984, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals handled appeals from the Board of Patent Appeals. See Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 527 (1966) (“Determinations of the Patent Office may be challenged
either by appeal to the CCPA or by suit instituted in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.”).
287. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 607–08.
288. Id. at 604–07.
289. Id. at 606.
290. As pointed out in note 285, supra, the amorphous form of the polymer was within the
prior art in 1953. Consequently, the amorphous form of 4-methyl-1-pentene did not have to be
disclosed in the specification. It was, however, disclosed in the references in the 1953
application. Thus, the court appears to have been mistaken as to the state of the art in 1953. This
does not affect the authoritativeness of its decision as precedent.
291. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606.
292. 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
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invention as well as the carbonized paper that they described in the
specification, and also that there were other vegetable fibrous materials that
they had not tested.293 In Consolidated Electric Light Co., the broad claim for
carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material did not satisfy the enablement
requirement under the state of the art as that was known at the time of the
filing of the patent application.294 In contrast, under the court’s view of the
circumstances in the Hogan case, the broad claim for a solid polymer did
satisfy the enablement requirement under the state of the art as that was known
at the time of the filing of the patent application, because the amorphous form
was not yet known.295 It is not clear, however, why this distinction should
make a difference. While Phillips may not have known that there was any
difference between a claim for a solid polymer and a crystalline form for a
solid polymer, because the existence of an amorphous polymer was not known
at that time under the court’s view of the state of the art in 1953, Phillips could
have limited its claim to the crystalline form for the solid polymer, if that is
what it disclosed in the specification.296
The Hogan decision continued:
Consideration of a later existing state of the art in testing for compliance
with § 112, first paragraph, would not only preclude the grant of broad claims,
but would wreak havoc in other ways as well. The use of a subsequentlyexisting improvement to show lack of enablement in an earlier-filed
application on the basic invention would preclude issuance of a patent to the
inventor of the thing improved, and in the case of issued patents, would
invalidate all claims (even some “picture claims”) therein. Patents are and
should be granted to later inventors upon unobvious improvements. Indeed,
encouragement of improvements on prior inventions is a major contribution of
the patent system and the vast majority of patents are issued on improvements.
It is quite another thing, however, to utilize the patenting or publication of later
existing improvements to “reach back” and preclude or invalidate a patent on
297
the underlying invention.

The references to “broad claims” in this and the previously quoted paragraph
suggest approval of Professor Kitch’s prospect theory of patents.298 The court
did not explain, however, why restricting the scope of protection to the
disclosure in the specification “would be a poor way to stimulate invention,
and particularly to encourage its early disclosure.”299 As the concurring
opinion by Judge Miller pointed out, the majority’s decision to extend the
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 472–74.
Id. at 476.
Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606.
See id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.
Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606.
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scope of protection to future technology would arguably impede rather than
advance progress.300 Judge Miller explained that the effect of the majority’s
decision was to relegate future inventions to a subservient position with respect
to the original invention merely because the inventor used a term that the
inventor thought was limited to a single species, but later turned out to have a
broader meaning.301 In addition, the court did not explain why patent
protection should extend to forms of materials that are unknown at the time of
the filing of a patent, but not to any other forms of materials that a patentee
might want to claim under a prospect theory of patents.302
Next, the court addressed concerns with invalidating a patent on
enablement grounds because of the subsequent discovery of a product that it
did not enable:
If applications were to be tested for enablement under § 112 in the light of
a later existing state of the art, the question would arise over how much later.
An examiner could never safely call a halt and pass an application to issue.
One who had slavishly copied the disclosed and claimed invention of a patent
issued in 1965, for example, could resist an infringement action by insisting
that a court hold the patent invalid because it was not enabling with respect to
some third product which first came into existence, and thus came within the
303
purview of the claim, in 1975.

The answer to this concern is that if future developments caused a claim to be
overbroad, the patentee could obtain reissuance of the patent under § 251 and
restrict the claim to the scope of enablement.304
Lastly, the court responded to the PTO’s concern about the possibility of
subsequent infringement actions against later inventors as follows:
The PTO position, that claim 13 is of sufficient breadth to cover the later
state of the art (amorphous polymers) shown in the “references,” reflects a
concern that allowance of claim 13 might lead to enforcement efforts against
the later developers. Any such conjecture, if it exists, is both irrelevant and
unwarranted. The business of the PTO is patentability, not infringement. Like
the judicially-developed doctrine of equivalents, designed to protect the
patentee with respect to later-developed variations of the claimed invention,

300. Id. at 610 (Miller, J., concurring). See Scotchmer, supra note 1.
301. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610.
302. See id. at 610–11.
303. Id. at 606–07.
304. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006):
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or
partly inoperative or invalid . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he
had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall . . . reissue the patent for the invention
disclosed in the original patent . . . for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.
See also O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1853) (permitting patentee to disclaim
claim that did not satisfy the enablement requirement).
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the judicially-developed “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” requiring
interpretation of claims in light of the specification, may be safely relied upon
to preclude improper enforcement against later developers. The courts have
consistently considered subsequently existing states of the art as raising
questions of infringement, but never of validity. It is, of course, a major and
infinitely important function of the PTO to insure that those skilled in the art
are enabled, as of the filing date, to practice the invention claimed. If, in the
light of all proper evidence, the invention claimed be clearly enabled as of that
305
date, the inquiry under § 112, first paragraph, is at an end.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Miller characterized the majority as
applying a double standard by interpreting claims in light of the state of the art
at the time of filing for purposes of enablement, but interpreting them in light
of the later state of the art for purposes of infringement.306 He urged that
instead of employing a double standard, the PTO should simply interpret the
claims in light of the state of the art at the time of filing to determine whether
they satisfy the enablement requirement.307 Judge Miller reasoned that in the
case of a claim for a solid homopolymer, if a person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of filing would have interpreted it to include both amorphous and
crystalline forms, and only the crystalline form was enabled, then the claim
should be rejected for extending beyond the scope of enablement.308 On the
other hand, if a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted the
claim to include only the crystalline form, the claim should be allowed and
limited to the crystalline form.309
The majority’s reliance on the reverse doctrine of equivalents to protect
later developers from “improper enforcement”310 is problematic. The reverse
doctrine of equivalents arose in case law as a defense to an infringement action
where a device came within the literal scope of a claim, but it was “so far
changed in principle from a patented article that it perform[ed] the same or a
similar function in a substantially different way . . . .”311 The Federal Circuit
has described this defense, however, as an “anachronistic exception, long
mentioned but rarely applied,”312 and it has never affirmed a decision in which

305. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 607 (footnotes omitted).
306. Id. at 610 (Miller, J., concurring).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 611.
309. Id. at 610–11.
310. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 607.
311. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
312. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
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the defense had succeeded at trial.313 Moreover, the courts have not
demarcated the limits of this defense clearly, if it actually still exists.
Consequently, later developers cannot expect the same protection from the
reverse doctrine of equivalents as they could expect from rigorous enforcement
of the enablement requirement to limit the scope of claims to the disclosure in
the specification as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals relied on the Hogan decision
three years later in In re Koller.314 In Koller, the patent examiner rejected a
claim for a process of producing a desired chemical from a precursor chemical
in which one of the steps involved mixing the precursor chemical with metal
salts in a “liquid medium.”315 Whether the claim was valid depended upon its
priority date, and this issue turned on whether the patent application related
back to the filing of the grandparent application, which also referred to mixing
in a “liquid medium.”316 The patent examiner based the claim’s rejection on
the failure of the disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to use
solvents that were not miscible (i.e., capable of being mixed to form a single
homogeneous substance) with water at the time the grandparent application
was filed.317 The court decided that the case paralleled Hogan because at the
time the grandparent application was filed, a person of ordinary skill in the art
would not have recognized that solvents which were not miscible with water
would be suitable for the patented process.318 Therefore, such a person would
not have included them within the scope of the term “liquid medium.”319 So
under Hogan, the enablement requirement was satisfied, because the disclosure
enabled mixing with the only types of solvents that were recognized at the
time—i.e., solvents that would mix with water.320 The court thus reversed the
decision of the Board of Appeals to affirm the examiner’s rejection of the
claim.
E.

Enforcement of the Hogan and Banks Patent

After the Third Circuit’s decision on the polypropylene interference
proceeding, the Hogan and Banks patent issued on March 15, 1983, over
twenty-seven years after the application was filed. The enforcement phase of
the litigation then began with Phillips filing infringement actions against a
313. Roche Palo Alto L.L.C. v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The
reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of
non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”).
314. In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 824–25 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
315. Id. at 820.
316. Id. at 821.
317. Id. at 821–22.
318. Id. at 824.
319. Koller, 613 F.2d at 824.
320. Id. at 825.
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number of companies. After obtaining licenses from Phillips to settle the
infringement actions, the infringement defendants filed an action against
Phillips, seeking declaratory relief that the Hogan and Banks patent was
invalid, not infringed, and unenforceable.321 In an eighty-one page opinion, the
district court held that the patent was valid and infringed.322
On the issue of enablement, the court observed that the infringement
defendants did not dispute that the 1953 application enabled a person of
ordinary skill in the art to make polypropylene that satisfied all the elements of
its single claim: “Normally solid polypropylene consisting essentially of
recurring propylene units, having a substantial crystalline polypropylene
content.”323 The defendants argued, though, that the application did not
describe or enable the entire class of compounds that came within the claim.324
Focusing on the intrinsic viscosity of 0.2 to 1.0 and the weight average
molecular weight of 5000 to 20,000 given in the specification,325 the
defendants asserted that the application disclosed only polypropylene that was
useless as a plastic for commercial applications and “was little more than a low
molecular weight, brittle laboratory curiosity.”326 They also contended that
“the 1953 application does not enable one to produce the high molecular
weight, tough polypropylenes of commerce.”327 Although the district court
acknowledged that “some of the market success of crystalline polypropylene
can be credited to higher molecular weights not attributable to the Hogan and
Banks invention,”328 it ruled that the 1953 application satisfied the written
description and enablement requirements.329 The opinion found that the
defendants missed the point of the inquiry under § 112, which was to
determine whether the “claimed” invention was described and enabled, and
that it was not necessary for a patent applicant “to predict every possible
variation, improvement or commercial embodiment of his invention.”330 The
court explained that since the claim did not include any limitations regarding
intrinsic viscosity or molecular weight, these factors were not relevant to the
written description and enablement requirements.331 It concluded that

321. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1283 (D. Del. 1987).
The declaratory relief action was consolidated with the original infringement actions against
Hercules, Inc. and U.S. Steel. Id.
322. Id. at 1358.
323. Id. at 1286, 1292.
324. Id. at 1292.
325. See supra text accompanying note 235.
326. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1290, 1318.
327. Id. at 1292.
328. Id. at 1318.
329. Id. at 1292.
330. Id. at 1292.
331. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1292.
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regardless of whether the defendants had a superior product to the
polypropylene described in the 1953 application, it was still crystalline
polypropylene that came within the claims of the patents.332
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court.333 The
defendants argued that the claim was too broad because it embraced subject
matter that lacked an adequate basis in the 1953 application.334 Relying on the
Hogan and Koller cases, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’
arguments:
Defendants’ misdirected approach here is the same as that improperly
relied upon by the PTO in Hogan. Defendants do not, as they cannot, argue
that the 1953 specification fails to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
claimed invention. That the ‘851 claim may cover a later version of the
claimed composition (crystalline polyproplene [sic] with higher intrinsic
viscosity and average molecular weight) relates to infringement, not to
patentability. To hold differently would, in the words of Hogan, “impose an
335
impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system.”

The appellate court continued, stating, “the central flaw [with] defendants’
evidence . . . [was] that it was directed solely to a later state of the art.”336 The
appellate court also rejected the defendants’ argument under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents, saying that the defendants provided no legal basis or
equitable grounds, and it saw none “for restricting the coverage of the claim to
less than its admitted literal scope.”337 With the Federal Circuit’s decision,
more than thirty years of polypropylene litigation came to an end.
Although the Federal Circuit did not explain its decision in these terms, the
decision can be understood as an example of a blocking patent in which an
improvement to a prior invention consists of a combination of a component
The essential difference between the
with the prior invention.338
polypropylene disclosed in the Hogan and Banks patent application and the
higher molecular weight polypropylene made with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts
was that the polypropylene made with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts had longer
polypropylene chains. The longer polypropylene chains made with the
Ziegler-Natta catalysts (i.e., A + B) were simply the product of combining
shorter polypropylene chains (i.e., A) with additional polypropylene units (i.e.,
B). Thus, the manufacture of the higher molecular weight polypropylene with

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 1357.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1250–51.
Id. at 1251–52 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.
See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
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the Ziegler-Natta catalysts necessarily entailed infringement of the Hogan and
Banks patent.
Nevertheless, the end result of allowing Phillips’ patent to dominate
Natta’s is troubling from the standpoint of the most appropriate allocation of
intellectual property rights. Natta’s contribution surely was greater than that
made by Hogan and Banks. Even today, most polypropylene is produced
using the Ziegler-Natta catalysts.339 Because of its high molecular weight, the
polypropylene produced with Ziegler-Natta catalysts has the toughness,
flexibility, and other desirable characteristics that have made it a success in the
marketplace. In contrast, the polypropylene produced with the Marlex
catalysts described in the Hogan and Banks patent is brittle and has never been
a successful commercial product.340 And the synthesis by Hogan and Banks of
their crystalline polypropylene in 1953 did not make the development by Natta
in 1954 of crystalline polypropylene using the Ziegler-Natta catalysts possible,
nor did it make it either cheaper or faster.341 Because Natta was not aware of
Hogan and Banks’ work until later, Hogan and Banks did not contribute in any
way to Natta’s invention. Furthermore, there is no indication that Hogan and
Banks or the other chemists at Phillips understood the mechanism for the
production of crystalline polypropylene through the lining up of the methyl
groups on the same side of the carbon chain until after Natta’s publication of
his experimental results and theoretical explanation in the Journal of the
American Chemical Society in 1955.342 Moreover, Phillips claimed crystalline
polypropylene only after learning of Natta’s publication. The payoff that
Phillips would have needed in order to recover the costs of the Hogan and
Banks invention was minimal since their discovery of polypropylene was
accidental in contrast to the focused activity of Ziegler and Natta in producing
crystalline polypropylene.343
In spite of all these reasons for minimizing the allocation of intellectual
property rights to Phillips, the Hogan and Banks patent was awarded priority
over Natta’s patent. Phillips was able to collect $300 million in licensing
revenues from polypropylene manufacturers through 1995344 even though the
manufacturers did not use the Marlex catalysts described in the 1953 Hogan
and Banks application, because the Ziegler-Natta catalysts produced superior
quality polypropylene than that produced using the Marlex catalysts.
339. MARTIN, supra note 214, at 31 (“Up to this day, polypropylene is produced on an
industrial scale exclusively with the use of Ziegler catalysts.”); MAIER & CALAFUT, supra note
199, at 7.
340. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1318 (D. Del. 1987).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 221–26.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 212–26.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 227–77.
344. Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 263, 266 (1995).
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The polypropylene litigation also spawned a peculiar legal precedent for
the enablement requirement that contributed to the outcome of the litigation.
Under this precedent, a patentee would be permitted to claim a genus that
includes unknown species that are discovered in the future if the specification
describes and enables all the species that are known at the time of filing the
patent application. This result is achieved through what Professors Merges and
Duffy characterize as the “temporal paradox,” where the description and
enablement requirements for the genus are determined as of the date of filing
the patent, and the patentee gets the benefit of any additions to the genus
discovered later. 345 A line of Federal Circuit decisions from the past several
years indicates this peculiar precedent has been eroded, however. The next
section of the article discusses these cases.
IV. RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAW
As discussed previously, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held in
In re Hogan,346 that a patent application that disclosed and enabled a method of
making the crystalline form of a polymer was entitled to a claim for the
method of making a solid polymer, because the only known method for
making a solid polymer at the time was the application’s method of making the
crystalline form.347 While the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals followed
Hogan in In re Koller348 and the Federal Circuit followed it in U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,349 the Federal Circuit has limited Hogan in Plant
Genetic System, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,350 and has virtually eliminated
Hogan’s effect in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.351 One circuit panel cannot
overrule a decision of an earlier panel,352 but a panel in a subsequent case may
interpret earlier precedent either expansively or narrowly, and the Federal
Circuit appears to have drastically narrowed Hogan’s scope as a precedent.
Since Chiron, the Federal Circuit has not referred to Hogan in any of its cases
that involved claims to a genus where only a single species was enabled.353

345. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39.
346. 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
347. See supra text accompanying note 289.
348. 613 F.2d 819, 823–24 (Fed. Cir. 1980).
349. 865 F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
350. 315 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
351. 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
352. See, e.g., LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“One threejudge panel . . . does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.”).
353. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc.
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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The Plant Genetic Systems case was concerned with genetically engineered
corn.354 The plaintiff had a patent for plants genetically engineered to resist a
type of herbicide that killed other plants by blocking an essential biochemical
process in them.355 The specification provided working examples of tomato,
potato, and tobacco plants that were genetically engineered to resist the
Generally, flowering plants are categorized as either
herbicides.356
monocotyledons (“monocots”), dicotyledons (“dicots”), or polycotyledons
(“polycots”), depending on whether they have one, two, or more than two
leaves in their initial growth from seeds.357 All of the working examples in the
specification were for plants that were dicots, but the claims were not limited
to dicots and broadly covered all plants.358 The defendant’s accused product
was corn, a monocot, which had been genetically engineered to resist the
particular herbicides with which the plaintiff’s patent was concerned.359 The
district court heard extensive testimony on the state of the art of genetic
engineering at the time of filing of the patent and found clear and convincing
evidence of a “monocot barrier,” which would have prevented a person of
ordinary skill in the art from making genetically engineered monocots without
undue experimentation.360 The district court accordingly ruled that the patent’s
broad claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement
because they were not limited to dicots.361
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.362 The
patentee argued that Hogan required reversal, but the Federal Circuit ruled that
Hogan did not apply:
We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed,
unless the patent discloses how to make and use it. In Hogan, amorphous
propylene [sic], on the record before the court, was not known or in existence
when the application was filed. In the present case, however, monocots
existed in 1987 and stably-transformed monocot cells were highly desirable.
PGS indeed asserts that monocot cells were already being stably transformed.
Thus, monocots and stably transformed monocot cells were not an unknown
concept that came into existence only after 1987. But stably transformed

354.
2001).
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
2003).

Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 246, 250 (D. Conn.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
Plant Genetic, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 270.
Plant Genetic Sys. N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
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monocot cells were difficult to produce, and the ‘236 patent gave no
363
instruction how.

The court’s statement in Hogan that “amorphous propylene . . . was not
known” is inaccurate for several reasons. First, propylene is a gas at room
temperature, and therefore, it surely was amorphous, rather than crystalline; of
course, propylene was well known when the 1953 Hogan and Banks filed their
application. Second, if the court was referring to polypropylene, rather than
propylene, the court’s statement is still incorrect, because Hogan dealt with a
divisional patent application for 4-methyl-1-pentene, rather than the patent for
polypropylene.364 Finally, the patent specification in Hogan characterized
amorphous polymers as prior art, and therefore, they were not unknown at the
time the application was filed.365
Because of all these factual errors, it is difficult to understand exactly what
distinction the Plant Genetic court was trying to make between Hogan and the
case before it. Certainly, monocots and stably transformed monocot cells were
not an unknown concept in 1987, but neither was “amorphous propylene” (or
whatever the Plant Genetic court meant to refer to) an unknown concept in
1953. If the Plant Genetic court intended to limit the reach of Hogan to
species that were nonexistent and unknown even as a concept at the time of
filing of a patent application, then Hogan would be a very narrow precedent. It
would be difficult to show that a species was an unknown concept at the time a
claim to the genus was filed, because it is much easier to have a concept for an
invention than it is to reduce an invention to practice.366 Conceivably what the
Plant Genetic court had in mind, however, was that Hogan permits a claim to a
genus to encompass a species that was not enabled in a patent specification
only if the species did not exist at the time the specification was filed. If the
species did exist at the time the specification was filed, but was difficult to
produce, the species would be anticipated,367 and therefore a claim to the
species would be invalid. The Plant Genetic court could not have meant
merely that the species did not exist, because the species would not have been
patentable if it already existed. Instead the court must have meant that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have required substantially more than
undue experimentation to make the species in order for a claim to a genus to
encompass the species if it was not enabled in a patent specification. It is not
clear how much undue experimentation should be required, however.

363. Id. at 1340.
364. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
365. See supra note 285.
366. For example, someone might conceive of a material with particular properties without
knowing how to make it.
367. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (invention is not patentable if it was “known or used by
others in this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent”).
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The last case involving the patentability of inventions in which the Federal
Circuit referred to Hogan is Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.368 The Chiron
case involved a patent for an antibody that bound itself to the human antigen
associated with breast cancer cells; by binding to the antigen, the antibody
facilitated the detection and treatment of breast cancer.369 The antibody was
the subject of an original patent application filed in 1984 and two continuationin-part applications filed in 1985 and 1986.370 The first application disclosed a
type of antibody called a murine antibody, which was derived from mouse
cells by cloning them.371 Murine antibodies have the disadvantage that they
are not suitable for long-term treatment of humans, because they create a risk
of an immunological response that can cause toxic shock or even death on
account of the antibodies having been derived from animal cells.372
Recombinant DNA technology has been used to produce other types of
antibodies that include chimeric antibodies and humanized antibodies, in
which part of the DNA encoding regions come from humans.373 Chimeric
antibodies and humanized antibodies are more suitable for long-term treatment
of humans than murine antibodies, because they have less nonhuman
content.374 The first publication to disclose chimeric antibodies appeared four
months after the filing of the first application in 1984, and the first publication
to disclose humanized antibodies appeared in 1986.375
The two continuation-in-part applications were filed after chimeric
antibody technology and humanized antibody technology, respectively, had
become known in the biotechnology field.
Although neither of the
continuation-in-part applications disclosed chimeric or humanized antibodies,
they included a broad definition of “antibody” not found in the 1984
application, which stated that it was “not intended to be limited as regards the
source of the antibody or the manner in which it is made.”376
When the patent finally issued, Chiron sued Genentech on account of
Genentech’s sales of a humanized antibody that was used in the long-term
368. 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit cited Hogan in relation to the
rulemaking authority of the United States Patent and Trademark Office in Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d
1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by Tafas v. Doll, 328 Fed.
Appx. 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
369. Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1252.
370. Id. at 1251.
371. Id. at 1250.
372. Id. at 1251.
373. Id. at 1250. Antibodies have primarily two regions: a constant region and a variable
region. Both chimeric antibodies and humanized antibodies may have a completely human
constant region, but unlike chimeric antibodies, humanized antibodies have a variable region that
is partially derived from a human. Id.
374. Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1251.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1252.
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treatment of breast cancer.377 The case was tried to a jury, which determined
that neither the original nor continuation-in-part applications satisfied the
written description and enablement requirements with respect to a claim for
chimeric or humanized antibodies.378 The verdict form, however, did not
specify which of the two requirements was not satisfied.379
On appeal, the Federal Circuit broke the enablement requirement into three
categories based on the knowledge available at the time of the filing of a patent
application. First, it found that at one end of the spectrum, a patent application
preferably should not disclose routine technology that was well known to one
of ordinary skill in the art.380 Second, citing Hogan, the court noted that, at the
other end of the spectrum, a patent application is not required to enable
technology that arises after its filing, because that would be impossible.381
Third, the court found that an enabling disclosure is required only for nascent
technology for which a person of ordinary skill in the art would need
instruction from the application to practice the invention.382
The court then applied these principles to the three patent applications. It
ruled that the 1984 application was outside of the bounds of the enablement
requirement, because the technology for making chimeric antibodies did not
arise until after the filing of the application.383 In contrast, by the time of the
filing of the 1985 and 1986 continuation-in-part applications, the technology
for making chimeric antibodies had become nascent technology.384
Consequently, the continuation-in-part applications were subject to the
enablement requirement, and the court found that substantial evidence
supported the jury’s decision that their specifications did not enable the claims
for chimeric and humanized antibodies without undue experimentation.385
Although the Chiron majority decided that the 1984 application was not
subject to the enablement requirement, it nevertheless affirmed the verdict on
account of the written description requirement.386 The court noted that the
function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor
had possession of the subject matter of the patent when the application was
filed, and that the Chiron scientists could not have had possession of chimeric
antibodies because they were not developed until later.387 A concurring

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id.
Id.
Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1252.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1255.
Id. at 1256–57.
Id. at 1255.
Id.
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opinion by Judge Bryson urged that the jury verdict should have been upheld
with respect to the original 1984 application as well as the 1985 and 1986
continuation-in-part applications for lack of enablement.388
Chiron’s ruling regarding the written description requirement appears to
negate the effect of Hogan entirely. Whenever it would be impossible for a
patent application to enable an unknown species of a genus, so that Hogan
would take the disclosure out of the enablement requirement, then it would
also be impossible for the patent application to describe the unknown species.
Thus, the written description requirement places the same impossible burden
on a patent applicant seeking to claim a genus that includes an unknown
species that an enablement requirement would have, were it not for Hogan.
While Hogan provides relief from this impossible burden with respect to the
enablement requirement, Chiron provides no such relief with respect to the
written description requirement. Thus, Chiron renders claims that extend to
unknown species invalid for failure to satisfy the written description
requirement rather than the enablement requirement. Whether a patent is
invalid for failure to satisfy one requirement or the other, the end result is the
same.
The Federal Circuit next addressed the issue of the validity of a claim to a
genus based on the disclosure of a species within the genus in Lizardtech, Inc.
v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.389 Lizardtech had a patent for data
compression software for digital images that included a claim for a method of
creating a seamless digital wave transform (“DWT”) of the image data and
then processing the data to permit storage of the transformed image in a
computer with a limited memory.390 The specification disclosed one way to
create the seamless DWT, which was by “maintaining updated sums” of DWT
coefficients calculated from the image data.391 But the claim in issue did not
specify how the seamless DWT was created, and therefore, it purported to
cover all ways of creating the seamless DWT.392
The Federal Circuit decided that there was no support for such a broad
claim in the specification, because it failed to demonstrate that the inventor
possessed the full scope of the claim and failed to enable the full breadth of the
claim. It explained:

388. Id. at 1261–63 (Bryson, J., concurring).
389. 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
390. Id. at 1337. For a thorough and insightful description of the factual background of the
case, see Merges, supra note 153.
391. Lizardtech, 424 F.3d at 1340.
392. Id. at 1340–41. Another of the claims included the “maintaining updated sums”
limitation, but the court had ruled that the defendant had not infringed that claim because the
defendant used an alternative method for creating the seamless DWT. Id. Lizardtech then argued
that the defendant infringed the broader claim. See id. at 1343.
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By analogy, suppose that an inventor created a particular fuel-efficient
automobile engine and described the engine in such detail in the specification
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to build the engine.
Although the specification would meet the requirements of section 112 with
respect to a claim directed to that particular engine, it would not necessarily
support a broad claim to every possible type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter
how different in structure or operation from the inventor’s engine. The single
embodiment would support such a generic claim only if the specification
would “reasonably convey to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had
possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing,” and would
“enable one of ordinary skill to practice ‘the full scope of the claimed
invention,’” . . . . To hold otherwise would violate the Supreme Court’s
directive that “[i]t seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to
the patentee and the public, than that the former should understand, and
correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.”
Thus, a patentee cannot always satisfy the requirements of section 112, in
supporting expansive claim language, merely by clearly describing one
embodiment of the thing claimed. For that reason, we hold that the description
of one method for creating a seamless DWT does not entitle the inventor of the
393
‘835 patent to claim any and all means for achieving that objective.

It is significant that the court did not address whether alternatives to
creating a seamless DWT were known at the time of filing the patent
application, because in the Plant Genetics case the Federal Circuit relied on the
knowledge of the other members (i.e., genetically engineered monocots) of the
claimed genus (i.e., genetically engineered plants) to distinguish it from
Hogan.394 The Lizardtech decision did not refer to either the Hogan or Plant
Genetic cases.
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.395 is another case in which the
Federal Circuit held claims invalid for lack of enablement due to lack of
support in the specification. The patent was for power fluid injectors used to
inject fluids into patients during medical procedures.396 Although all the
examples in the specification included a pressure jacket on the injectors, the
claims did not require the injectors to have a pressure jacket.397 The district
court determined that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement of

393. Id. at 1346 (citations omitted).
394. See supra text accompanying note 363.
395. 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
396. Id. at 1373.
397. Id. at 1374. When the original patent application was filed, the claims included the
limitation of a pressure jacket on the injectors, but the patentee removed this limitation from the
claims during patent prosecution after learning that the defendant was making a jacketless injector
system. Id.
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injectors without a pressure jacket, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.398 The
appellate court explained:
[I]n this case, the asserted claims read on, and the full scope of the claimed
invention includes, an injector system with and without a pressure jacket.
There must be “reasonable enablement of the scope of the range” which, in this
399
case, includes both injector systems with and without a pressure jacket.

The Federal Circuit also found claims invalid for lack of enablement
because they extended beyond the specification in Automotive Technologies
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.400 The case involved crash
sensors for use in deploying airbags during side impact car accidents which
were triggered by a vehicle’s velocity changes upon exceeding a threshold
value.401 The claims did not specify the particular types of sensors to be used
in the invention, but the specification had a detailed description of a
mechanical velocity sensor and a briefer description of an electronic sensor.402
The district court decided that the claims were invalid with respect to
electronic sensors, because the description of them in the specification was not
sufficiently detailed to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make
them.403
The Federal Circuit affirmed and explained:
We also reject ATI’s argument that because the specification enables one
mode of practicing the invention, viz., mechanical side impact sensors, the
enablement requirement is satisfied. We addressed and rejected a similar
argument made in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) . . . .
Similarly, in this case, the claim construction of the relevant claim
limitation resulted in the scope of the claims including both mechanical and
electronic side impact sensors. Disclosure of only mechanical side impact
sensors does not permit one skilled in the art to make and use the invention as
broadly as it was claimed, which includes electronic side impact sensors.
Electronic side impact sensors are not just another known species of a genus
consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly different sensor compared with the
well-enabled mechanical side impact sensor that is fully discussed in the
specification. Thus, in order to fulfill the enablement requirement, the
specification must enable the full scope of the claims that includes both

398. Id. at 1375, 1378.
399. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380. The court also pointed out that it was ironic that the
plaintiff had successfully argued that the claims encompassed injectors with no pressure jackets,
but lost the case in the end because the broad claims were invalid for lack of enablement. Id.
400. 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
401. Id. at 1276–77.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1280.
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electronic and mechanical side impact sensors, which the specification fails to
404
do.

The Federal Circuit’s most recent case on the enablement of a claim to a
genus is Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC.405 Sitrick had two patents for integrating
a user’s audio signal or visual image into a pre-existing video game or
movie.406 Sitrick sued Dreamworks for infringement of these patents on
account of Dreamworks’s including in the DVDs it made and distributed a
feature called ReVoice Studio that allowed users to add their own voices to the
movies on the DVDs.407 Sitrick’s patents included claims for the integration or
substitution of a visual or audio user image in place of a predefined image in a
presentation.408 The specifications “described the ‘integration’ or
‘substitution’ as being performed by an ‘Intercept Adapter Interface System’
(IAIS),” which is used “[i]n a video game system . . . to intercept address
signals . . . [between] the video game apparatus and . . . the game card or
storage card.”409 The claims were not restricted to video games, however, and
the specification of one of the patents began: “[T]his invention relates to
predefined video and audiovisual presentations such as movies and video
games.”410
The district court found all the claims invalid for lack of enablement as to
movies, because the patent specifications did not explain how the IAIS from a
video game system would work for movies. It noted that Dreamworks’ experts
had testified that video games differed significantly from movies, because in
video games, the images of the various characters in the story were retrieved
by discrete address signals, while the images of the characters in pre-existing
movies were inseparable from the surrounding images. Consequently, the
techniques for intercepting address signals for video games had no relevance to
movies, and the disclosure did not enable use of the IAIS for movies.411 In
affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit held:
The full scope of the claimed invention must be enabled. The rationale for
this statutory requirement is straightforward. Enabling the full scope of each
claim is “part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain.” A patentee who
chooses broad claim language must make sure the broad claims are fully
enabled. “The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the
enablement” to “ensure[ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. at 1285 (citations omitted).
516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 995–96.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 996.
Id. at 998, 1000.
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specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the
412
claims.”

The Lizardtech, Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick
cases each dealt with a claim to a genus based on a specification that enabled
only one species in the genus. In each case, the Federal Circuit emphasized
that a claim to a genus would not satisfy the enablement requirement if the
specification enabled only a single species; instead, the specification was
required to enable the full scope of the claim. None of these cases referred to
Hogan or addressed whether the enablement requirement was not applicable
on account of a species within the genus that was not known or in existence at
the time of filing and therefore was impossible to enable then. In light of the
limitation on Hogan in Plant Genetic that a species must have been an
“unknown concept that came into existence only after” the filing of the patent
specification to avoid the enablement requirement, and the holding in the
Chiron case that a claim to a genus would not satisfy the written description
requirement with respect to an unknown species, it appears that there is little
left of Hogan as a precedent.413
CONCLUSION
The allocation of intellectual property rights between earlier and later
inventors of related technology involves inevitable tradeoffs. To the extent
that an earlier inventor receives a blocking patent with respect to after-arising
technology that a later inventor makes, the later inventor may lack the
appropriate incentive to create the after-arising technology. But if the earlier
inventor is not allowed a blocking patent with respect to the after-arising
technology, the earlier inventor may lack the appropriate incentive to create the
original invention on which the after-arising technology depends.
It would seem that the optimal allocation of the intellectual property rights
in after-arising technology between the earlier and later inventors should
depend on their relative contributions and the effect that the allocation of
intellectual property rights would have on their respective incentives. Instead
of basing the allocation on these types of particularized considerations,
however, the patent law uses broad, across-the-board rules. The first is that a
patent on an original invention (A) will dominate a patent on an improvement
that involves a combination of the original invention with an additional
component (A+B). Although the later inventor may receive a patent for the
improvement, that patent is blocked by the patent on the original invention,
and the earlier inventor’s permission is required for the later inventor to

412. Id. at 999 (internal citations omitted).
413. Plant Genetic Sys. N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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practice the patent on the improvement. The second is that a patent on a
product will dominate a later patent on a process for making or using the
product.
Beyond these instances of blocking patents, several cases beginning with
In re Hogan ruled that an earlier inventor of a single species was entitled to a
broad claim to a genus if that species was the only member of the genus in
existence at the time of the patent application, and then the patent would
dominate later patents for other species within the genus that were developed
later.
The doctrinal basis for Hogan was that the enablement requirement for
patentability is tested at the time of filing the patent application, and that the
scope of a patent could extend to after-arising technology that was within the
broad claim to the genus that included a species which the patent’s disclosure
enabled. The holding in Hogan appears to have been eroded by recent Federal
Circuit decisions, though. First, the Federal Circuit limited Hogan in Plant
Genetic System, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. to circumstances where the
after-arising technology was not merely difficult to produce, but was instead an
unknown concept.414 Then, in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that even if a claim to a genus could satisfy the enablement
requirement with respect to the after-arising technology, the claim would
nevertheless be invalid because it could not satisfy the written description
requirement.415 Since Chiron was decided, Hogan has not been cited in any of
the four cases where the Federal Circuit has ruled that patents with broad
claims did not satisfy the enablement and written description requirements
because their patent specifications did not support the full range of the claims.
The loss of Hogan as a precedent seems warranted from an economic
standpoint. It is certainly possible that the invention of the first species in a
genus would contribute to the development of other species in the genus. It is
likely, however, that this would not be so much of the time, and unless the
invention of the first species contributed to the development of other species,
intellectual property rights to the other species should not be allocated to the
inventor of the first species in the genus. Consequently, blocking patents
should be limited to inventions involving combinations of an earlier invention
with an additional component and processes for making or using a patented
product.

414. 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
415. 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

